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The Education of Religious Children:
Families, Communities and Constitutions
SHAUNA VAN PRAAGH t
I. INTRODUCTION
In Philip Roth's short story, "Eli the Fanatic,"' a Jewish
lawyer named Eli Peck sends a letter to Mr. Tzuref, the
headmaster of the town's yeshivah. Peck is concerned about
the yeshivah itself-the conspicuousness of boys busily
studying Torah and Talmud-but he is particularly
concerned about the appearance of one man dressed in
black, complete with sidecurls and a black "Talmudic hat.'
t Assistant Professor Faculty of Law and Institute of Comparative Law McGill
University. This article is written in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the J.S.D. degree at Columbia University School of Law. Much appreciation
goes to the members of my doctoral committee at Columbia University--Kent
Greenawalt, Martha Fineman and Jane Spinak-whose example and guidance
have helped make this project possible. Thanks are also owed to the Canadian
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council for support for my doctoral
research, and for the current funding of a related project on "Critical Legal
Pluralism"; and to the Boulton Trust Fund of the Faculty of Law at McGill
University, which provided substantial support for my doctoral research and
writing.
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It seems to me that what most disturbs my neighbors are the
visits to town by the gentleman in the black hat, suit, etc.
Woodenton is a progressive suburban community whose members,
both Jewish and Gentile, are anxious that their families live in
comfort and beauty and serenity. This is, after all, the twentieth
century, and we do not think it too much to ask that the members
of our community dress in a manner appropriate to the time and
place.3
Tzuref responds: "The suit the gentleman wears is all
he's got."
The heated conversation that ensues between the two
men includes the following exchange:





"No one. Before the people there was no law..
'Wrong," Tzuref said.
"We make the law, Mr. Tzuref. It is our community.
These are my neighbors. I am their attorney. They pay me.
Without law there is chaos."
'What you call law, I call shame. The heart, Mr. Peck,
the heart is law! God!" he announced.
"Look, Mr. Tzuref, I didn't come here to talk
metaphysics. People use the law; it's a flexible thing. They
protect what they value, their property, their well-being,
their happiness -"
"Happiness? They hide their shame. And you, Mr. Peck,
you are shameless?"
'We do it," Eli said, wearily, "for our children. This is
the twentieth century.... ."
The story is fiction. But the dispute and its themes are
real and as pertinent to North America today as they were
when Roth created the characters forty years ago. Here we
find the contemporary liberal state, marked by integrated
communities of citizens passing on to their children a belief
in the power of people, the order of law, the concept of
3. Id. at 189.
4. Id. at 189.
5. Id. at 192.
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shared neighborhood, the participation of all members of
society in dialogue, and the construction of a vision for the
future. We also find a commitment to religious belief and
way of life, a concept of God as the ultimate law-maker and
giver, a clear indication that the clothing, education,
prayers, and daily routine of individuals and their
communities may not feel consciously chosen. Instead, they
may be "all they've got," the only understanding they share.
In this paper, I attempt to contribute to the ongoing
discussion of the interactions among religion, law, and
identity by focusing on children and education. By drawing
on selected defining moments in the broad constitutional
self-understandings of Canada and the United States,
whether embodied in Supreme Court cases or loudly
broadcast public debates, I hope to illustrate the ways in
which communities and their members are conceived,
constructed, and recognized. I focus on children because, as
Eli the Fanatic says, "We do it for our children:"
Discussions of multiculturalism and diversity, difference,
and identity politics, civic republicanism, commun-
itarianism, and value-laden liberalism, implicate the
education, guidance, and upbringing of children. Whether
understood as mini-citizens, citizens-in-training, or the
future of a particular religious or cultural "sub-community,"
and whether explicitly acknowledged or not, children are at
the heart of the analysis of relations between the state and
communities. They are central to familial disputes,
community evolution, and state-directed policy.
Further, schools can be understood to function as the
"public sphere" for children-usually understood to belong
to the "private sphere" of the family. Often seen as being too
young to participate in the workplace, the market, or the
town square, children in school interact with each other,
and learn about themselves and their world.6  Thus,
6. The example of education is chosen to complement the "private sphere"
examples of child welfare and child custody, both of which I have explored
elsewhere in thinking about the relations between children, families, religion,
and state. See Shauna Van Praagh, Religion, Custody and a Child's Identities,
35 OsGOoDE HALL L.J. 309 (1997); Shauna Van Praagh, Faith, Belonging and
the Protection of "Our" Children, 17 WimDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 154 (1999)
[hereinafter Van Praagh) Faith]; see also Shauna Van Praagh, La diversitg des
enfants: un defi pour l'Etat pluraliste, LEKTON, Spring 1994, at 155; SHAUNA
VAN PRAAGH, The Youngest Members: Harm to Children and the Role of
Religious Communities, in THE PPvATE NATURE OF PUBLIC VIOLENCE 148, 149
(Martha A. Fineman and Roxanne Mykitiuk, eds., 1994); Shauna Van Praagh,
1345
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
jurisprudence and politics related to children and education
can tell us much about the constitution not only of a state
but of the multiple normative communities that live within
and across its borders. By focusing on children and
education, I locate communities within the picture of
family-state relations in a way that enriches our
understanding of all three interacting entities.
Four alternative ways of thinking about education and
the children of religious communities are explored below.
All four can be identified in a contemporary liberal,
pluralist state, and I look to both the United States and
Canada for examples that illustrate these co-existing
models for the interactions between the claims of religious
communities and the law of the secular state. One is
"Citizenship and Civic Virtues," a model which provides for
state-based learning that focuses on developing citizenship
but from which some religious communities may request
and be granted exemption. Another is "Parallel Learning," a
model in which children of religious communities learn in
separate, confessional schools. The third presents a picture
of public school as "Meeting Place," in which religious
children may not be able to find themselves. Finally, the
"Multiculturalism" model of education calls for careful
contemplation of the diverse individuals and identities that
make up a classroom.
For each "model" or possible understanding of the
relationship among individual, (religious) community, and
state, a case study is offered as illustration. Thus, I refer to
the following as concrete indicators of the way in which the
law of the state, or more specifically the state's
constitutional self-perception, views religious communities
in the context of education: the 1971 United States
Supreme Court case of Wisconsin v. Yoder,' the 1994 United
States Supreme Court Kiryas Joel' case, the 1996 Canadian
Supreme Court decision in Adler v. Ontario,9 and the 1995
hijab controversy in Montreal. 9 In each of these case
Bringing the Charter Home, 38 MCGILL L.J. 233 (1993) (reviewing JOHN T.
SYRTASH, RELIGION AND CULTURE IN CANADIAN FAMILY LAW (1992)).
7. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
8. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687
(1994).
9. [1996] 3 S.C.R. 609 (Can.).
10. See, e.g., Marie McAndrew and Michel Page, Entre d~magogie et
d6mocratie: Le d6bat sur le hijab au Quebec (1995) (unpublished manuscript,
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studies or "defining moments," I focus on the message that
is conveyed to the religious community at stake and to
other normative communities more generally. Each answer
that the law provides, each approach that the state adopts
vis-d-vis religious communities evokes a response by the
communities themselves and a picture of co-existence or
conflict inspired by the claims of community members.
In all four instances, religious parents have a voice in
shaping the particular forms and purposes of education for
their children. Yet the issues at stake go beyond the
parameters of parental beliefs, powers, and responsibilities
concerning their children. The religious communities to
which the children, their parents, and even their schools
belong are actively involved and profoundly affected.
Religious communities are perceived, and perceive of
themselves, in multiple ways: as sources of obligation and
individual development, as institutions of civil society
providing guidance and opportunities for interface with the
state, and as enclaves fiercely protecting a way of life from
external influence. Reflected in the multiple structures
within law that exempt, accommodate, shun, or integrate
members of religious communities, community-derived
perceptions and responses have an impact both on families
and on state laws and constitutions.
II. STAKE-HOLDERS IN THE EDUCATION OF CHILDREN
A brief exploration of what it means to send children to
school, and why it matters, serves as an introduction to the
models of education and communities suggested by the four
case studies or "defining moments." Children are rarely the
explicit focus of political and legal theory. When we refer to
rights-holders, adults usually come to mind; when we worry
about the meaning of citizenship, children tend to be
incidental; when the challenge that diversity poses for
liberalism is articulated, its concrete manifestations in the
realm of education are often overlooked." A comparative
on fie with the Universitd de Montrial); QUEBEC HUMAN RIGHTS COmmiSSION,
RELIGIOUS PLURALISM IN QUEBEC: A SocIAL AND ETHICAL CHALLENGE (1995);
CONSEIL Du STATUT DE LA FEMME, REFLFXON SUR LA QUESTION Du PORT Du
VoILE A LlCOLE (1995).
11. A recent exception to these general observations is embodied in an
excellent collection of essays arising from a conference on pluralism in public
institutions and the role of the school in pluriethnic societies (Le pluralisme
1347
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analysis of the ways in which Canada and the United
States construct themselves, their institutions, and their
legal traditions and systems makes a discussion of rights,
citizenship, and diversity inevitable. Leaving out children,
and the way in which the liberal state watches them learn
and grow into adults, excludes a crucial component of that
discussion.
When we think of children, it is impossible not to
recognize their connections to the people who care for them,
provide resources for their well-being, and constitute the
networks or communities within which they develop.
Children learn from teachers, mentors, and peers. They
depend on family members and providers; and they enrich
their beliefs, values, and understandings with the guidance
and support of the communities to which they belong.
The most obvious, and perhaps most important, lesson
to be drawn from these general observations is that
children live their lives in relation to others; those
relationships may be positive or they may be damaging, but
they are fundamental to the very notion of childhood."2
Thus, individual autonomy for children is elusive if
premised on the notion of being left alone. It is only
meaningful if understood as a process of becoming
autonomous, of developing a sense of self that melds unique
individuality and affiliations with multiple persons, groups,
communities and institutions."3
The related lesson is that the very nature of childhood
implies a learning process. That is, many of the
relationships that characterize children's lives contain some
dans les institutions publiques et le r6le de l'cole dans les socidtds
pluriethniques), held in Montreal in December 1995. See PLURALISME,
CITOYENNET. & ADUCATION (France Gagnon et al. eds., 1996). Included are
essays by Will Kymlicka, Chantal Mouffe, Joseph Carens, Benjamin Barber,
and Marie McAndrew, and the themes range from cultural and religious
diversity in the liberal state to identity, educational institutions, and pluralism.
12. See Van Praagh, Faith, supra note 6.
13. See generally Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert
Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860 (1987) (rethinking rights for children); MARTHA
MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AmERICAN
LAW (1990) (noting the complexities of identity-related claims); Jennifer
Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities, 1 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 7 (1989) (analyzing the self through connection); Jennifer
Nedelsky, Law, Boundaries and the Bounded Self, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 162
(1990) (suggesting children as models for rethinking autonomy); SUSAN MOLLER
OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE FAMALY (1989) (focusing on the family as the
site for justice claims).
1348 [Vol. 47
1999] EDUCATION OF RELIGIOUS CHILDREN
element of education. Children develop by learning from
those around them, including parents, siblings, peers,
teachers, community leaders, and icons; and the less
immediate characters in books, films, television, and CD
ROMs. 4 The centrality of learning in children's lives makes
it the medium for expressing the values and objectives that
we find important.
But, who are the "we"? The answer to that question
tells us what and why children learn, and vice versa. That
is, control of education is intimately linked to the
flourishing of our society and its members and
communities, and thus becomes an arena for overlapping
and sometimes conflicting identities and interests.
The largest "we" with a stake in the meaning, content,
and purpose of education is the liberal state. Premised on
individual autonomy and dignity, liberalism invests in a
sharing of fundamental assumptions and values among the
citizens of a liberal society. The meaning of citizenship and
the degree of sharing of commitments are topics for
intensive debate over the meaning and scope of liberalism. 5
14. School is not the only place in which children learn, and this list is
meant to reflect that reality. See Guy Bourgeault & Linda Pietrantonio, L'1cole
dans une socidtd pluraliste et 4'inddpendence morale des individus,,, in
PLURALISME, CITOYENNETt & tDUCATION, supra note 11, at 231, 247. "Elle
[l'dcole] est toutefois le lieu privildgi6 de la structuration des apprentissages en
m~me temps que de la formalisation des savoirs." Id.
15. See generally ELIZABETH FRAZER & NICOLA LACEY, THE POLITICS OF
COMMUNITY (1993) (examining a feminist critique of the liberal-communitarian
debate); WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMuNITY, AND CULTURE (1989)
(studying liberalism in the context of the relationship between the individual
and society) [hereinafter KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM]; WILL KYMLICKA,
MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS (1995)
(exploring clashes between majorities and minorities over political issues)
[hereinafter KYMLicKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP]; STEPHEN MACEDO,
LIBERAL VInTUES: CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE, AND COMMUNITY IN LIBERAL
CONSTITUTIONALISM (1990) (exploring the values of liberalism as ideology);
MARTHA MINOW, MA ING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
AMERICAN LAW (1990) (discussing how the language of individual rights over-
simplifies identity-related claims); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 11 (1993)
(discussing political justice in a liberal democratic society); MICHAEL J. SANDEL,
LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982) (discussing the role of justice,
fairness, and individual rights in liberalism); CHARLES TAYLOR, MULTI-
CULTURALISM AND "THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION" (1992) (discussing the place
of recognition of culture in liberal societies); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF
JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983) (offering a community-
based theory of the self and the state); Joseph Carens, Democracy and Respect
for Difference: The Case of Fiji, 25 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 547 (1992) (illustrating
the relationship between identity and democratic values); Stephen A.
1349
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Given that education, and particularly public education, is
understood to fall within the jurisdiction of the state, that
debate implicates children. The commitments, values, and
even virtues of liberal society are cultivated among its
youth, and the purposes and goals of learning in childhood
are tied to the ideals and self-perception of the liberal state
itself.6
While "we," as society, may articulate broad outlines for
the shape of the education of our children, it is often against
the claims and wishes of parents that those outlines become
clear. In both the United States and Canada, while theories
of political thought and education may focus on models of
learning, citizenship, and l'enjeu ethico-politique,7 the law
Gardbaum, Law, Politics and the Claims of Community, 90 MICH. L. REV. 685
(1992) [hereinafter Gardbaum, Law, Politics, and the Claims of Community]
(situating various forms of community-related claims in a liberal state);
Stephen A. Gardbaum, Why the Liberal State Can Promote Moral Ideals After
All, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1350 (1991) [hereinafter Gardbaum, Why the Liberal
State]; Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CAL.
L. REV. 753 (1984) (exploring the difficulties courts face in determining whether
something qualifies as religious) [hereinafter Greenwalt, Religion]; Sanford
Levinson, On Political Boundary Lines, Multiculturalism, and the Liberal State,
72 IND. L.J. 403 (1997) (discussing politics and the space for cultural
recognition); Sanford Levinson, Religious Language and the Public Square, 105
HARV. L. REv. 2061 (1992) (reviewing MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE
ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1991)); Sanford
Levinson, Some Reflections on Multiculturalism, "Equal Concern and Respect,"
and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 989
(1993) [hereinafter Levinson, Some Reflections] (discussing links between
religious freedom and multiculturalism); Dominique Leydet, Reconnaissance,
identitd et pluralisme: les limites du projet de Taylor, 4(1) LEKTON (1994)
(focusing on the meaning of cultural recognition); John Rawls, The Idea Of An
Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1987) (defining a timeless
political conception of justice); Joseph Raz, Multiculturalism: A Liberal
Perspective, 41 DISSENT 67 (1994) (providing a theoretical framework for
multiculturalism); Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, "He Drew a Circle That Shut Me
Out:" Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106
HARV. L. REV. 581 (1993) [hereinafter Stolzenberg, He Drew a Circle]
(discussing religious difference in the school setting); Carol Weisbrod, Family,
Church and State: An Essay on Constitutionalism and Religious Authority, 26 J.
FAM. L. 741 (1987-88) (offering models for interaction between state and
religious community).
16. See Stephen Macedo, Liberal Civic Education and Religious
Fundamentalism: The Case of God v. John Rawls?, 105 ETHICS 468 (1995); AmY
GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION (1987) (discussing the goals and form of
education in a liberal democracy); Bourgeault & Pietrantonio, supra note 14,
(focusing on the significance of moral independence in the liberal state and how
school fosters that value).
17. The term defined in English means "ethical-political stakes." See
1999] EDUCATION OF RELIGIOUS CHILDREN
has emphasized the scope and meaning of parental rights
with respect to the upbringing and guidance of children.
The "we," defined narrowly, then, can signify parents who
may voice their hopes and convictions in opposition to those
of the state writ large. Whether grounded in notions of the
privacy of the family, the liberty of individuals to bring up
their children and instill particular values within them, or
the religious freedom of individuals embodied in their
beliefs and practices in the upbringing of their children, 8
parental rights are the primary vehicle for challenging the
contours of education invested in by the state.
Typically, the law is confronted with the clash of
lifestyles, beliefs, norms, and legal obligations referred to in
Philip Roth's story, when individual parents seek
exemption from, or accommodation within, the space of
public education. By envisaging parent-child relations in
terms of individual rights, the liberal state contemplates
and permits individual dissent from the very structures and
values of liberal society, including its public schools. 9 But
this picture of an individual parent arguing with the state
over a child is incomplete. Both Canada and the United
States are liberal democracies with diverse populations; the
identities of their citizens are multiple, in terms of country
of origin, culture, history, language, faith, race, and
Chantal Mouffe, supra note 11, at 81.
18. See U.S. CONST. amend. I, amend. V, amend. XIV, § 1; see also
Constitution Act of 1982, pt. I, ch.11, § 7 (U.K.). "Everyone has the right to life,
liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except
in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice." Id. at § 2(a). Section
2(a) states that "freedom of conscience and religion" is a fundamental freedom.
Id. The recognition of the constitutionally protected rights of parents with
respect to their children has been both recent and somewhat reluctant in
Canada. Those rights are definitely not entrenched in constitutional meaning
and practice as they are in the U.S.; indeed, judges of the Supreme Court of
Canada are currently battling over the degree to which broad notions of
parental liberty should be borrowed from the U.S. See, e.g., B.(R.) v. Children's
Aid Soc'y of Metro. Toronto [19951 1 S.C.R. 315; Hester Lessard et al.,
Developments in Constitutional Law: The 1994-1995 Term, 7 Sup. CT. L.R. (2d)
81 (1996); Van Praagh, Faith, supra note 6.
19. See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of
Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990); Michael W.
McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem: Abortions and Religious Schools,
104 HARV. L. REV. 989 (1991); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of
Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 685
(1992) [hereinafter McConnell, Accommodation of Religion]; see also
Greenawalt, Religion, supra note 15 at 753.
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ethnicity." Recognition of the pluralist character of their
societies implies acknowledging that communities, too, can
make claims as the "we" with a stake in the education of
children. Indeed, although parents make their
constitutional claims as individuals, their insistence as to
their rights often reflects their affiliation to particular
communities complete with visions and expectations for
their children.
Communities themselves may not make explicit claims
in courtrooms or under constitutions, but they do
participate and speak, are heard, and receive messages.2
When courts articulate the purpose and limits of public
education, and when parents articulate the reasons for
which their children should be excluded from either public
schools or a publicly dictated academic curriculum, or both,
the interests and existence of communities are at stake.
The law of the state has a profound impact on communities;
it is capable of assuring or attacking their very future and
well-being.2 Conversely, the diverse communities to which
children belong can have a significant effect on the role and
definition of the state, and, in particular, the structure and
content of education. When the values of religious
commitment, maintenance of identity and tradition, and
living an observant life within an observant community, are
propagated through the education of a religious
community's children, the meaning of citizenship in a
multicultural reality is shaped.
Religious communities-and their perspective on the
resolutions to the conflicts embodied in the case studies
examined below-form the focus of this discussion. I do not
20. The list could go on, and identities obviously include, for example,
gender, class, abilities, and sexual orientation. The identity-related factors I
have listed in the text are meant to reflect the kinds of communities that
usually find themselves in disputes over forms of education and schooling of
children, and that are referred to in discussions of "multiculturalism" in both
countries.
21. Note, however, the direct involvement of churches and sectarian schools
in the recent challenge to the Newfoundland government's attempt to change
the structure of the province's school system so that it was no longer religiously
based. See Hogan v. Newfoundland Sch. Bds. [1997] 149 D.L.R. 468 (S.C.T.D.).
22. These ideas are influenced by the work of Robert Cover. See ROBERT
COVER, NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE AND THE LAw (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1992)
[hereinafter COVER, NARRATVE]; Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982
Term. Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983) [hereinafter
Cover, Nomos].
1352 [Vol. 47
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adopt a rigid definition of religious communities attached to
the doctrine and dogma of their official structures and
organizations. Instead, the notion of religious community
essentially flows from the people whose shared sense of
obligation, historical narrative, commitment, and faith have
brought them together.' In addition, the definitions of the
communities to which an individual belongs-and they are
multiple and intersecting-are not fixed. They may differ
from individual to individual in the sense that the
community's significance stems from its meaning in the
lives of each of its members.24
I also understand communities to be normative orders
in that their members may understand their affiliation to
be the source of both the social relations and normative
commitments crucial to their lives. Communities, then, may
constitute "legal" systems in their interactions with the
legal system of the state and in the way they resist,
circumvent, and contribute to the law of the state. 5 At the
same time, they can be described as institutions within civil
society: together with families, unions and neighborhoods,
religious communities organize themselves and mediate
between their members and the state."
For the purposes of this discussion, the precise contours
of communities and their moral and legal sway with respect
to both the people who grow up as adherents and the state
need not be traced. The shared and significant
23. This understanding of the need to pay attention to the notion of the
community held by its members has been largely inspired by Cover, see id., as
well as the insights of legal pluralism. See Shauna Van Praagh, The Chutzpah
of Chasidism, 11 CAN. J. L. & Soc'Y 194 (1996) [hereinafter Van Praagh,
Chutzpah].
24. For a development of these ideas, see generally, Van Praagh, Faith,
supra note 6 at 54.
25. This idea is suggested by both legal pluralism and polyjurality. Legal
pluralists emphasize the importance of the norms and rules of various
communities (in addition to state law) in regulating and ordering the lives of
their members. See, e.g., John Griffiths, What Is Legal Pluralism?, 24 J. OF
LEGAL PLURjLISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 1 (1984); Sally E. Merry, Legal Pluralism: A
Literature Review; 22 L. Soc. REv. 869 (1988); Roderick A. MacDonald, Critical
Legal Pluralism as a Construction of Normativity and the Emergence of Law, in
THEORIES ET PMERGENCE Du DROIT (Andrde Lajoie ed., 1997); Bonaventura De
Sousa Santos, Law: A Map of Misreading, Toward a Postmodern Conception of
Law, 14 J. L. & Soc'y 279 (1987). For a discussion on polyjurality, see STUDIES IN
LEGAL SYsTEMS: MIXED AND MIXING (Esin Ortici et al. eds., 1996).
26. See Richard Brooks, Law and Civil Society in the United States, Canada,
Quebec, and the First Nations, 15 ARIZ. J. INTL & COMP. L. 1 (1998).
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characteristic of religious or normative communities is that,
rather than passively being circumscribed by state dictates,
they actively shape their relations with the state and, in so
doing, define the meaning of religious identity in a
multicultural society. The education experience of religious
children allows us to articulate and assess various possible
relationships and interactions between state and normative
communities.
Four alternative, yet co-existing, ways of understanding
education in a liberal and pluralist society are illustrated by
the four moments of conflict I have selected for analysis.
Each imparts a particular message to members of religious
communities; each makes space in a different way for life
and learning according to religious precepts and
obligations. As will be seen, the children of religious
communities go to school in a variety of circumstances.
Some religious children are kept home from school and
exempted from education and its accompanying picture of
citizenship; some are required to mix with children from
other communities if their learning is to be subsidized;
others insist on their religious identity and affiliation at the
same time that they participate in the promise of public
education. The resolution of each conflict, and the decisions
made concerning the education of children, implicitly
include the input of their communities and have substantial
consequences for those communities.
III. THE COMMUNITY'S CHILDREN GO TO SCHOOL
A. Citizenship and Civic Virtues-Possibilities for
Exemption?
Intersecting justifications exist for a concept of
education that values the fostering of citizenship and the
formation of individual participants in public life. Those
who see state society as a large substantive community, its
members sharing in a sense of public spirit and social
order,27 might see public education as the critical foundation
27. For an excellent discussion of the notion of community in contemporary
moral, political, and legal theory, including an incisive exploration of
communitarian claims, see Gardbaum, Law, Politics, and the Claims of
Community, supra note 15; see also KYMimcKA, LIBERALISM, supra note 15;
KYMRLICKA, MULTUCULTURAL CITIZENSHIP supra note 15.
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for the requisite individual dedication to a shared notion of
human flourishing.' Those concerned with the primacy of
individual agency and autonomy in a liberal state might
insist on public education as the forum for instilling critical
abilities, for assessing and pursuing new opportunities, for
developing a sense of self and of one's rights and duties
with respect to others.29 These justifications overlap in that
a public education system designed for all children takes
seriously the importance of their development both as
individual actors and as active participants in their shared
political community. Accordingly, the fact that children
bring with them many religious and cultural identities and
affiliations should pose no barrier to their full involvement
and participation as students.
In order to probe the implications of this generalized
picture of education and, in particular, public education, I
turn to the case of Wisconsin v. Yoder,' now a "classic" in
American jurisprudence on the family, free exercise of
religion, and education. Almost thirty years ago, the United
States Supreme Court decided that Old Order Amish
parents could take their children out of school after eighth
grade in keeping with the tenets of their faith and way of
life. It might seem strange that the Yoder story be retold in
order to flesh out an essentially secular model for
understanding education. But the Court in Yoder, in
exempting the Old Order Amish from public education as
defined by the State of Wisconsin, does discuss what it is
that school is meant to offer all children, Amish or not. The
Court accepts that "[piroviding public schools ranks at the
very apex of the function of a State.""' Justice White
concurring, cites from Brown v. Board of Education,'
"[education] is the very foundation of good citizenship."
3
Concerned with the range of options open to Amish
28. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH
OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1996); Frank Michehnan, Family Quarrel, 17
CARDozo L. REv. 1163 (1996).
29. See Bourgeault & Pietrantonio, supra note 14. This approach is, of
course, informed by a basic liberal sensibility ubiquitous in North American
politics and law-often as the target of critique. See generally Gardbaum, Why
the Liberal State, supra note 15; KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, supra note 15;
KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP, supra note 15.
30. 406 U.S. 205 (1971).
31. Id. at 213.
32. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
33. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 238.
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children, Justice White sees the goals of public education to
be the following:
[The state is] attempting to nurture and develop the human
potential of its children...: to expand their knowledge, broaden
their sensibilities, kindle their imagination, foster a spirit of free
inquiry, and increase their human understanding and tolerance.
3 4
The role of schools in nurturing their students and
preparing them for a life of ongoing inquiry and human
understanding corresponds to the citizenship model of
education, introduced above. The model can be elaborated
upon by recognizing that children in a diverse, secular
society may belong to, and be valuable members of, multiple
communities. But when they pass through school, whatever
its precise form or nature, they emerge as public citizens
who share certain (although perhaps minimal) civic
values. 5 Further, as Amy Gutmann has asserted, the
education of children is meant to maximize their future
freedom as adults that is, the capacity to choose a good life
and good society.&'
This liberal citizenship model allows for giving parents,
and indirectly communities, some degree of control over the
education of their children. After all, parents are generally
understood to act in the interests of their children, and to
take on the primary responsibility of caring for them. If
they send their children to public school as suggested by
this model of education, however, the rights of parents are
limited to claims for accommodation of particular beliefs
within the public school system." Even if they do not enroll
34. Id. at 239.
35. See, e.g., James W. Skillen, Religion and Education Policy: Where Do We
Go from Here?, 6 J.L. & POL. 503 (1990) (examining the Jeffersonian ideal
according to which public education served as a means of inculcating and
promoting common republican virtues in a country of diverse states, families,
churches and schools).
36. See, e.g., Amy Gutmann, Children, Paternalism and Education: A
Liberal Argument, 9 No., 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 338 (1980) [hereinafter Gutmann,
Paternalism]; AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION (1987) (adjusting her
earlier position by admitting that the teaching of virtue may be a goal of
education, and, the democratic virtue of "conscious social reproduction" justifies
necessarily non-neutral education).
37. See Mozert v. Hawkins County Pub. Schools, 582 F. Supp. 201 (E.D.
Tenn. 1984), rev'd 765 F.2d 75 (6th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988); Stolzenberg, He drew a circle, supra
note 15; see also McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, supra note 19.
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in public school given their deep opposition to the values
seemingly espoused by the state, and to the notions of
independent thinking and options in life, parents cannot
simply opt out of state-controlled education.8 Indeed,
Gutmann insists that the state should interfere to ensure
that every child be exposed to conditions that develop the
capacities for personal choice and democratic citizenship.39
A restriction of educational opportunities equals a failure to
fulfill the duties of all parents toward children in a liberal
democratic society. Children can grow up to be full citizens
only if they are "free to choose a way of life compatible with
their larger communal identity."'
This model for understanding education is not only
controversial but unacceptable to people such as the Old
Order Amish. A community invested in a religiously based
and insular way of life may well perceive of the education of
children as fundamental,4 ' but the form, purpose, and
content .of that education differ radically from those
attached to state-sponsored and supervised public
education. Perhaps most crucially, the significance of
individual choice for the graduates of an educational
process, including the option of rejecting the obligations and
expectations shared by family and community members,
may be profoundly negative from the community's point of
view. Such a choice may lead the child astray, thereby
endangering both that child's spiritual well-being and in a
literal sense, the community's survival.
38. I intend this in the broadest sense. It is clear, as further discussion will
show, that children in the U.S. and Canada are not obliged to attend public
schools. However, education they receive, whether in public, private or home
schools, is governed in some way (even if minimally) by the state.
39. See Gutmann, Paternalism, supra note 36, at 349-51. Kymlicka insists
on the importance of autonomy but, at the same time, recognizes collective
interests and values. See id. Community affiliation, in his view, can give
children a framework for developing individual autonomy. See generally,
KYMU1CKA, LIBERALISM, supra, note 15; Will Kymlicka, Ddmocratie libgrale et
droits des cultures minoritaires in, Gagnon et al. eds., supra note 11
[hereinafter Kymlicka, Ddmocratie].
40. GuTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION, supra note 36, at 44-45. The Amish
community, according to Gutmann, works to eliminate the "freedom to choose."
Id.
41. See also Van Praagh, Chutzpah, supra note 23, at 207. The values held
by members of Chasidic Jewish communities--religious commitment,
maintenance of identity and tradition, living a meaningful life within an
observant community... are 'lived' through family and learning." Id.
42. It is interesting that this perspective, brought forward by members of
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The fact that the Amish were successful in their claim
might suggest that Yoder poses a two-pronged threat or
challenge to the secular citizenship model of education.
First, Yoder recognizes the upbringing of American children
as a crucial component of the constitutional protection of
parental rights to the free exercise of religion.43 Not only did
the religious beliefs and practices of Amish parents inform
their decisions with respect to the education of their
children, but the constitutional guarantee of free exercise
meant that Amish families were exempted from state law
making school attendance to the age of sixteen compulsory.
In this sense, then, the case has been seen to reinforce the
"charter of the rights of parents to direct the religious
upbringing of their children. '
Second, and alternatively, Yoder has been characterized
as the "modern American hymn to pluralism." The
recognition by the United States Supreme Court of the
particular nature and 300 year history of the Old Order
Amish faith, and the Court's willingness to value, albeit
the Old Order Amish community in Yoder, assumes that exposure to "outside
values" will prompt exit; that is, those values will "win" over the values instilled
in Amish children within their community. Justice Douglas, in his dissent,
focuses on the autonomy of the children of the community; in acknowledging the
phenomenon of exit, he argues that a shortened education imperils the future of
these students. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 245.
43. This goes hand in hand with the rights of parents to privacy and
substantive due process, guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); see also Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925). For commentary and critique, see generally Barbara
Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?"." Meyer and Pierce and the Child as
Property, 33 WAI. & MARY L. REV. 995 (1992). Note that religious freedom's
inclusion of the freedom to transmit and implant religion in one's children
precedes Yoder. See Marc Galanter, Religious Freedoms in the United States: A
Turning Point, 1966 WISC. L. REV. 217, 228-29.
The principles established by the Supreme Court in Yoder later were
interpreted in Smith v. Employment Div'n, 494 U.S. 872 (1989), in a manner
that may cast some doubt on the Free Exercise of Religion doctrine. In Smith,
the United States Supreme Court's majority ruled that Free Exercise as applied
in Yoder did not extend to situations where otherwise prohibited conduct is
accompanied by religious convictions. See id. n such cases, the conduct itself is
not free from governmental regulation even if this substantially burdens a
religious practice. See id. at 882-83. Provided that the state's actions are
justified by a compelling governmental interest, it may apply a general
prohibition or policy, which may prohibit or limit religiously motivated conduct.
See id.
44. Chief Justice Burger refers to Pierce in this way. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at
233.
45. Martha Minow, Pluralisms, 21 CoNN. L. REv. 965, 968 (1989).
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also to romanticize,46 the Amish way of life,' suggests a
significant power that the religious communities have over
their children and their future. In other words, it seems
that the distinctive character of the diverse communities
that make up the United States is strongly reflected and
indeed, endorsed, by the law's willingness to accept
alternative visions of childhood and public education.
The decision is better understood, however, as the
carving out of an exception that, given its extremely narrow
character, actually can be seen to strengthen the model of
liberal secular education. Instead of signaling a broad
victory for community-based values and education, Yoder
remains a case about the peculiarities of the Old Order
Amish. It is Old Order Amish parents who are permitted to
exercise their freedom of religion by deciding for their
children that education past the eighth grade is
inappropriate. It is a small, insular community with a
particular history in the United States that is allowed to
retain its children by explicitly limiting their option for
"exit."
More specifically, as the Chief Justice takes pains to
point out, the Amish constitute an old, established group in
the United States whose central tenet is the leading of a
"life aloof from the world.' Their way of life rooted in
religious belief, the Amish preserve what Chief Justice
Burger characterizes as static definitions of family and
home.49 But it is the good "citizenship" of the Amish that,
paradoxically, appears to convince the Court that their
children be permitted to drop out of an institution dedicated
to citizenship. To the Court, the Amish seem to meet the
Jeffersonian ideal of the American citizen more than do
other Americans: they are the "sturdy yeomen"
46. In his dissent, Justice Douglas refers to the myth of "idyllic agrarianism"
which was identified in the court below, and which he believes was accepted
and perpetuated by the majority of the Supreme Court. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at
247, n.5.
47. In the words of Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority: "Amish
society emphasizes informal learning-through-doing; a life of 'goodness,' rather
than a life of intellect; wisdom, rather than technical knowledge; community
welfare, rather than competition; and separation from, rather than integration
with, contemporary worldly society." Id. at 211.
48. Id. at 210.
49. This makes an interesting contrast to Cover's characterization of
normative communities based on shared obligation as dynamic and creative.
See Cover, Nomos, supra note 22.
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fundamental to society," dedicated to farming, self-reliance
and non-criminal behavior.5' Combined, the ideal behavior
of the Amish and the depth of their religious conviction
persuade the Court to defer to their desire to send children
to school only to the eighth grade."
Far from rejecting a model of education that invests in
the imparting of civic values and the creation of public
citizens, then, Yoder sets out conditions under which some
families, in some communities, can "drop out" of the general
picture through the mechanism of a parent's individual
right to the free exercise of religion. Significantly, those
families and communities have to look like the Old Order
Amish. Living separately, or claiming isolation, is not
enough. The Amish distinguish themselves as an admirable
and sincere community with roles, beliefs, tenets, and
practices that would be contravened by secondary
schooling.53
Yoder does not represent a fundamental adjustment to
the notion that Americans interact and flourish in a public
sphere characterized by the individual pursuit of chosen
priorities and goods, and that their children go to school to
prepare for just such a life. Excluding oneself, one's
children, and one's community, from that mixed public
sphere-only possible through the exercise of individual
rights that incorporate parental authority over the
upbringing of children-is exceptional." Indeed, permitting
such exclusion represents only one limited way that the
state can respond to the claims of communities with a
strong normative structure, unique narrative or self-
understanding, and strict sense of membership." A much
50. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 225.
51. The Amish reject public welfare and abide by the law, observations that
Douglas J. in dissent, characterizes as "irrelevant." Id. at 246.
52. Chief Justice Burger compares 200 successful years of Amish existence
in the U.S. with a mere 60 years of an "education to tenth grade" policy. Id. at
226-27.
53. See DONALD B. KRAYBiLL, THE RIDDLE OF AMISH CULTURE (1989)
(describing the Amish people); see also Stolzenberg, supra note 15, at 634-39
(discussing Yoder and Chief Justice Burger's characterization of the Amish
community and its prescriptive way of life).
54. See Abner S. Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes about Equality, 96
COLUMBIA L. REV. 1 (1996). In his discussion of Kiryas Joel, Greene makes an
argument for the "permeable sovereignty" of a community like the Chasidim or
the Amish, and would endorse "partial exit" of the group from larger liberal
society. Id. at.
55. See generally COVER, Nomos, supra note 22; see also, COVER, NARRATIVE,
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more common way of recognizing religious communities-
whether insular or integrated-is to allow their children to
attend schools open only to members of their particular
communities. School in the United States and Canada can
be sponsored, organized, and run by some religious
authority, and, as the following discussion indicates,
parallel learning in sectarian schools in Canada is partially
publicly funded and constitutionally guaranteed.
B. Parallel Learning-The Cost of Religious Faith
Alongside a picture of education as a process of instilling a
sense of citizenship, participation, and individual
autonomy, exists the possibility of sectarian or confessional
learning. Again primarily linked to parental faith and
freedom, this model of education respects the right of
parents to direct the upbringing of their children within a
particular religious community." Rather than implying
strict exemption from state law related to the content and
structure of education and the school curriculum, however,
this model contemplates religious schools that comply with
secular directives. Thus, Catholic children might enter
Catholic school, be educated in both a secular and religious
sense within that institution, and emerge as both public
citizens and more mature members of the Catholic
community.
The community, according to this model, is not an
extra-curricular space and identity for the child; it is not
something to which the child belongs in a secondary way.
Children in a private Jewish school in Canada, for example,
are taught both as "Jewish Canadians" and as "Canadian
Jews:" both labels capture their reality.57 Religious identity,
then, is not all-encompassing within this picture; rather,
supra note 22.
56. See R. v. Jones [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284; see also B.(R.) v. Children's Aid Soc'y
of Metropolitan Toronto [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Note that both Wilson J.
in Jones and La Forest J. in Children's Aid Socy make reference to the
American jurisprudence.
57. Lois SWEET, GOD IN THE CLASSROOM 68-75 (1997). Lois Sweet, in her
journalistic study of religion and education in Canada, compares a publicly
funded Jewish school in Alberta with a private independent Jewish school in
Ontario, and illustrates the way in which both schools resist assimilation,
support Jewish learning, and meet provincial education curriculum
requirements.
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participation as citizens in public life is contemplated, as is
a significant degree of individual choice, regarding what
ends one's education serves."
One key difference between secular, or mixed, schools
and confessional schools is often that of subsidy; that is,
parents may be required to pay to send their children to the
latter. This is clearly the case in the United States, given
the principle of anti-establishment embodied in the
Constitution.59 In Canada, as the recent decision in Adler v.
Ontario" reminds us, education within a religious faith
need not carry a price tag. Confessional schools may indeed
be public." Explicitly lacking an anti-establishment
58. Note that graduates of sectarian schools cannot usually avoid moving
into the broader community when they attend public universities or enter the
workforce.
59. This principle is contained in the First Amendment which reads:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press, or of the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. See generally
Reinterpreting the Religion Clauses: Constitutional Construction and
Conceptions of the Self, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1468 (1984); Ira C. Lupu, To Control
Faction and Protect Liberty: A General Theory of the Religion Clauses, 7 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 357 (1996); Ira C. Lupu, Models of Church-State
Interaction and the Strategy of the Religion Clauses, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 223
(1992); Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against
Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV 555 (1991); JESSE
H. CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: PRINCIPLES FOR JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES (1995); Jesse H. Choper, The Rise
and Decline of the Constitutional Protection of Religious Liberty 70 NEB. L. REV.
651 (1991); LEONARD WILLIAIS LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986); Stephen M. Feldman, Principle, History and
Power: The Limits of the First Amendment Religion Clauses, 81 IOWA L. REV.
833 (1996); see also McConnell, supra note 19; Greenwalt, Religion, supra note
15. My discussion of Kiyas Joel examines the United States Supreme Court's
declaration that a public, non-religious school run by a Chasidic Jewish
community for Chasidic children with special needs violated the anti-
establishment clause. See infra Part II(C).
60. 140 D.L.R. (4th) 385 (Can. 1996).
61. See Zylberberg v. Sudbury Bd. of Educ., [1990 65 O.R. (2d) 641 (C.A.).
The line between secular and religious has been blurry in other ways as well.
Not only are the schools of some religious denominations publicly funded in
some provinces, but public secular schools have included religious components.
Thus, for example, it has been very recently that the Lord's Prayer was
removed as a mandatory component of the school day in public Ontario schools;
see also Canadian Civil Liberties Ass'n v. Ontario (Education Minister), [1990]
71 O.R. (2d) 341 (Can.) (also known as the Elgin County case, where the
Ontario Court of Appeal held that Christian indoctrination as contemplated by
the Education Act, R.S.O. ch. 129, (1980), was unconstitutional).
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principle in its history, politics, jurisprudence, and
constitution, Canada's founding constitutional document
promised religious minority groups (e.g. Roman Catholics in
largely Protestant Ontario and Protestants in largely
Catholic Quebec) the right to the continuance of publicly
funded schools that received such funding at the time of
Confederation.62 As a result of this historic guarantee,
Roman Catholic schools in Ontario receive public finding.'
In Adler v. Ontario,' the Supreme Court of Canada was
asked whether the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms mandated the funding of Jewish and independent
Christian schools in Ontario. Unlike several provinces,
which have gone beyond the particularities and limits of the
constitutional promise and have subsidized a range of
religious schools," Ontario does not support separate
denominational schools other than Roman Catholic ones.
Ontario's failure to fund non-Catholic religious schools was
the perceived injustice that grounded the Adlers' claim.
The Adlers, together with other parents whose children
attend private Jewish and Christian schools, argued that
their freedom of religion and right to equality, guaranteed
by the Charter, demanded that their particular private
religious schools receive equivalent public financial
support.66 The Supreme Court of Canada rejected that
62. See CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1867), §93.
63. See Hogan, 149 D.L.R. at 468. Religious minority schools existing at the
time of Confederation included those of the Catholic minority in Ontario and
the Protestant minority in Quebec; thus the current funding situation. It is
interesting to note that the provinces of Quebec and Newfoundland have
recently taken steps to amend the constitutional arrangement with respect to
religious schools, thereby moving to a secular public school system.
Newfoundland's change included extensive public debate, litigation, and two
referendums. See Graeme Hamilton, Tobin Wins Big: Newfoundland Votes 3-1
to Get Churches Out of Schools, THE GAZETTE (Montreal), Sept. 3, 1997, at A8;
Newfoundland Sends School Issue on to Ottawa, THE GAZETrE (Montreal), Sept.
6, 1997, at B8. Both Constitutional amendments, which require the approval of
the province and the federal Parliament, were approved by Parliament at the
end of 1997. For approval of the Quebec amendment see 135 PARL. DEB., H.C.
(5th Ser.) 032 (1997) at 1870-71. For approval of the amendment for
Newfoundland see 135 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th Ser.) 047 (1997) at 3009-10.
64. 140 D.L.R. (4th) 385 (Can. 1996).
65. See id. at 419-27. L'Heureux-Dub6 J., in her dissent in Adler, points out
that Quebec, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia all
provide partial funding for religious schools.
66. See id. The appellants argued that their freedom of religion was violated
because the combination of compulsory schooling laws and state funding of
public schools imposed an economic burden on them not imposed on those
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claim, thereby upholding the school system as found in
Ontario. 7  The appellants further claimed that their
children with disabilities and special needs should be
provided with publicly funded support services within the
confessional schools they attend. That claim was also
denied.'
Significantly, the judges in Adler have no trouble with
acknowledging that public authority over education can be
linked to a particular religious community. But only the
Roman Catholic community qualifies in Ontario; the
arrangement is not any religious community's for the
taking. The religious communities represented by the
parents in Adler, rather than insisting on insular
separation for their schools and children, tried but failed to
adopt for themselves the framework in place for Catholics,
the major religious minority group in the province.
It is instructive to examine the various responses
offered by members of the Court to the challenge brought by
the appellants in Adler. Very different notions of the
responsibility of the state with respect to education in a
multi-religious, multicultural Canadian society emerge,
with corresponding pictures of appropriate acknowledgment
of religious communities and their children.
The majority of the Court simply refers to the historical
constitutional arrangement for particular religious
whose religious beliefs allowed them to attend public schools. The Constitution,
they therefore argued, compelled the state to provide them with religious
schools whether or not Catholic schools received such funding. They argued that
their right to equality was violated, first, as a result of the funding of Catholic
schools but not those of other denominations, and second, because secular
schools (acceptable within some people's religious beliefs) were funded, while
the religious schools the appellants' religious beliefs compelled them to attend
were not.
67. See id. at 391-409. The majority of the Court, in a judgment by Iacobucci
J., held that the Charter could not be used to assess the constitutional
guarantee of denominational school rights. Concurring members of the Court
(Sopinka J., with Major J. concurring) applied CAN. CONST., (Constitution Act,
1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), §2(a) (freedom of
religion) and §15 (equality) to the arrangement and found no violation of
religious freedom or of equality. In dissent, L'Heureux-Dub6 J. found a violation
of the guarantee of equality, saying that education is crucial to the future of
faiths.
68. See Adler, 140 D.L.R. at 462-63. The Court did seem somewhat more
responsive to this claim. McLachlin J. found the denial of support to be an
unjustifiable violation of equality. L'Heureux-Dub6 J. concurred with
McLachlin J. on this point.
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communities and their children. A political compromise in
nature, that arrangement was incorporated into the
constitutional fabric in Canada and has been previously
examined and upheld in Supreme Court jurisprudence."
According to Iacobucci J., writing for the majority, the
religious educational guarantees of s.93 constitute a
"comprehensive code with respect to denominational school
rights."" Outsiders in the form of denominations not
explicitly included cannot use the Charter, a much more
recent addition to the Canadian Constitution, to pry open
what was a complete and exclusionary deal in the 19th
century. Further, this comprehensive code includes the
public school system, according to the majority of the Court;
that is, publicly funded non-denominational and Catholic
schools were always to be provided by Ontario, and this
mandate as such remains free from Charter scrutiny.,
In taking this approach to the claims made by the
Adlers and their co-appellants, the Court refuses to assess
the school system in Ontario from a religious freedom or
equality perspective. But a reader does not get the sense
that the Court relishes the current arrangement. Instead, it
seems resigned to a political legacy and wary of opening the
door to increased fragmentation of the population of
Ontario's school children.' Public schools open to all, and
free of charge, remain available to the Adler children.
Perhaps the clear refusal even to consider the argument
that the lack of funding for non-Catholic denominational
schools constitutes discrimination is meant to encourage
the Adlers and others to participate fully in the promise of
public schools.
Three separate judgments by the Court72 grapple more
openly with the impact of Ontario's funding arrangement
on religious freedom and equality and, indirectly, on
69. See Reference Re Act to Amend the Education Act (Ontario), 1 S.C.R.
1148 (1987) (Can.); Reference Re Education Act (Que.), 2 S.C.R. 511 (1993)
(Can.).
70. Adler, 140 D.L.R. at 402.
71. Although the majority judgment does not say this explicitly, and indeed
recognizes that the province could pass legislation responding to the Adlers'
claims, the majority refuses to discuss diversity and equality and instead
focuses on the constitutional requirements imposed on the Ontario government.
See id. The implicit result is that public schooling for all Ontario children is in
effect encouraged. See id.
72. See Adler, 140 D.L.R. at 430-52 (Sopinka, J.); id. at 452-63 (McLachlin,
J.); id. at 409-30 (L'Heureux-Dub6, J.).
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religious communities in general. Unlike the majority, they
refuse to immunize the province's general authority over
public schools from Charter scrutiny. The argument,
however, that individual religious liberty has been violated
by the lack of funding for the appellants' denominational
schools is met by resounding resistance. In effect, the
burden faced by these parents is not created by the state;
according to Sopinka, J., "the disadvantage they must bear
is one flowing exclusively from their religious tenets""3 and,
according to McLachlin, J., the "absence of state funding for
private religious practices.., has never been seen as
religious persecution."74 That is, no positive obligation exists
on the part of the state to ensure that the choice of enrolling
one's children in a religious school is cost-free. At least,
individual religious liberty of parents requires no such
commitment.
It is with respect to the equality argument that a
debate emerges over the best way to achieve the ideal of a
more tolerant society that displays respect for diverse
cultures and beliefs. Acknowledging the overlap between a
religious freedom claim and a claim for equality in this
case, Sopinka, J. again finds no causal connection between
the statutory framework and the compulsion these
appellants feel in sending their children to religious school.
Further, he points out, no private or independent schools
receive funding; thus, no discriminatory distinction is made
between the Adlers and other private school parents. 5 In
general, according to Sopinka J., public schools have
become increasingly secular 6 and it would seem strange to
open the door now to publicly funded institutions of a
particular denominational character.
For McLachlin and L'Heureux-Dub6, JJ., the burden
carried by parents, compelled by their religious beliefs to
prefer denominational schools over secular schools, is a
73. Id. at 446.
74. Id. at 454.
75. This argument seems particularly weak, especially given the broad
definition of equality that has emerged since Law Society of British Columbia v.
Andrews, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (Can.), which rejects the "similarly situated" test
for inequality. Further, it is only possible to say that private schools don't
receive funding if Catholic schools are defined as "public," given their
constitutionally-dictated provincial financial support.
76. See Bal v. Ontario (Attorney-General) [1994], 21 O.R.(3d) 681 (Gen Div.),
which followed Canadian Civil Liberties Ass'n v. Ontario (Minister of
Education) [1990], 71 O.R.(2d) 341 (C.A.).
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result of unequal treatment and discrimination on the basis
of religion. That is, while members of religious communities
are free to believe and practice as they wish, they do
experience inequality in that they cannot send their
children to school without paying for that education." Note
also the fact that both McLachlin and L'Heureux-Dub6, JJ.
focus on the line drawn between public, funded schools and
private, religious, non-funded schools, rather than on the
line between Catholic and non-Catholic religious schools.
The disagreement between these two judges arises over the
justification offered by Ontario for the distinctions it
draws. 8 One opinion accepts a connection between the
denial of funding to parochial schools and greater exposure
to diversity in the public secular schools,' thereby seeing
the legislative scheme in Ontario as the most promising
route to an ideal multicultural forum in which "children of
all races and religions learn together and play together.""
The other says that (at least partial) fimding is crucial to
the recognition of the particular faith-related needs of the
child and adult members of minority religious groups, and
thus to foster the "values of a pluralist, democratic society,
including the values of cohesion, religious tolerance, and
understanding."8
Interestingly, both of these judges work with similar
visions of what true diversity and respect for multiple and
77. Note the willingness here to equate the "choice" to send children to a
denominational school with a religious "compulsion" to do so. Unlike Sopinka,
J., McLachlin, J. and L'Heureux-Dub6, J. refuse to question the appellants'
perspective on the "choice" they have with respect to education. Cf. Adler v.
Ontario [1996] 140 D.L.R. 385, 413, 456-57.
78. The Ontario government argued that the provisions were justified under
the CAN. CONST., (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms), §1, which reads "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it, subject only to such reasonable
limits as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." Id.
This section both guarantees the rights and freedoms contained in the Charter,
and allows a government to justify a law which violates one of its sections. See
R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can.). Section one has led to a broad definition
of the Charters rights because of the rigorous standard of justification
demanded by the court. Because of the availability of this balancing provision,
the rights themselves are to be given a "generous" interpretation. See R. v. Big
M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, 344 (Can.); see also PETER W. HOGG,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA (3d ed. 1992) (describing the functioning of this
section).
79. See Adler, 140 D.L.R. at 459 (McLachlin J.).
80. Id. at 458.
81. Id. at 421 (L'Heureux-Dub6 J.).
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overlapping religious and cultural identities might look
like.82 For McLachlin, J., that vision is captured best within
the public school itself. Thus it makes sense to encourage
everyone to participate fully in the public school experience.
Parallel learning is to be limited as much as possible, and
forcing people to pay for parallel confessional education is
one way to achieve that end. L'Heureux-Dub6, J., on the
other hand, steps back to look at society through a wider
lens. For her, a multicultural society can incorporate a
diverse array of educational choices and experiences;
indeed, it must do so if it is to truly respond to the range of
individuals and groups of which it is constituted. 3 Thus, the
state has some responsibility to support the denominational
schools organized and invested in by various religious
communities.-
Religious communities receive numerous, conflicting
messages from Adler. In general, Adler reminds Canadians
that there does exist some room for a model of "parallel
learning:" a model whereby children are initiated as
students to secular knowledge and civic values within the
confines of a school that itself belongs to a religious
community. No great transformation from community
member to public citizen occurs; instead, membership in a
particular community, which is in turn always situated
within the public domain, is retained, enriched, and
developed. Confessional schools are part of the public
education landscape, committed to both secular and
religious education and membership. Some provinces
82. McLachlin J. states that the goal of the legislation is the "fostering [of]
multiracial and multicultural harmony." Id. at 461.
83. See id. at 421. This is in keeping with the observation made by Sanford
Levinson, albeit in an American context: "[t is difficult to escape the
conclusion that a due respect for multiculturalism requires that one tolerate...
the ability of parents to socialize the children in ways of life that one regards as
quite unattractive." Sanford Levinson, On Political Boundary Lines,
Multiculturalism, and the Liberal State, 72 IND. L.J. 403, 413 (1997).
84. L'Heureux-Dub6 J. points out that partial funding at least would not
fundamentally hurt the nature or extent of the public school system and
furthermore, would "attenuate the discriminatory effects of legislation which
completely denies any finding and thus any recognition of these communities'
educational needs." Adler, supra note 58, at 426. See Christopher Richter,
Separation and Equality: An Argument for Religious Schools Within the Public
System, 28 OTTAWA L. REV. 1 (1996-97) for a strong discussion of the
consequences of religious freedom and equality rights in a liberal democracy.
Richter argues that, subject to state direction of basic curriculum, minority
religious groups should be able to establish public schools.
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provide at least partial funding for religious schools, beyond
those specified in the Constitution Act, 1867. Ontario, on
the other hand, seems to make space for Catholic schools
within its public domain because it is constitutionally
obliged to do so; other religious communities must pay for
the parallel education their children receive.
The further message to religious communities is more
complicated. They are told, in varying degrees of
explicitness, that they are free to "choose" public and mixed
schools for their children. Whether in the form of a flat
refusal to consider the claims of their members, a finding
that they have somehow brought the burden upon
themselves, or the more subtle hope that financial
considerations might drive them towards full participation
in the diverse and harmonious public secular schools, the
Supreme Court seems to hold up public education as an
ideal that provinces are meant to endorse and encourage.
Even in her dissent, L'Heureux-Dub6 J. agrees with the
objective of fostering a healthy environment of social
tolerance and harmony through public schools. Her
message to religious communities is one of conditional
understanding: she accepts that religious education is
crucial to their existence and future, but she expects them
also to participate (and to be included) in public life in a
way that flows from the education of their members.85
I turn now to the claims of a particular religious
community in the case of Kiryas Joel," decided by the
United States Supreme Court in 1994. Here, a group
defined by religious belief and way of life wanted to act as a
public authority with respect to a school for its children.
Unlike the situation in Adler, the Chasidic Jews in Kiryas
Joel could not point to an analogous arrangement for any
other religious community in order to ask for equal
treatment; unlike the situation in Yoder, this community
did not try to isolate itself through exemption from state
85. "In such a system [universal], the objective of encouraging religious
tolerance becomes linked to discouraging non-secular education. However, such
a link is not inevitable. In fact, it is not the goal of encouraging social tolerance
and understanding that creates a difficulty for the appellants, but rather the
secular nature of the education. For example... the environment in the Jewish
day schools was very conducive to social tolerance, successful integration, and
acceptance of others." Adler, 140 D.L.R. at 421-22 (LHeureux-Dub, J.
86. Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687
(1994).
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requirements. Instead, the Kiryas Joel Chasidim accepted
parallel, private, non-funded education for most of their
children, but wanted public support for their children with
special needs. Indeed, they hoped to establish and oversee a
public school solely for those children.
C. The Unbearable Importance of Mixing
In Kiryas Joel,17 the United States Supreme Court was
asked to decide on the constitutionality of New York state
legislation8 which made the Village of Kiryas Joel, home to
approximately 10,000 Satmar Chasidic Jews, into a
separate school district complete with full school district
powers and duties. 9 The Satmar community, whose
members lead lives characterized by religious devotion,
particular dress, insularity from secular and modern
influences, and delineated gender roles," had incorporated
their village as a separate local government in 1977. In this
way, they could exercise control over issues related to
zoning, building, and taxation, as can other enclave
communities and neighborhoods in New York State,
according to the state's "Village Law."91
The children of the Satmar Chasidic community attend
private, religious schools. The significance of the family for
the growth of the community, the fostering of religious
commitment, and the enforcement of Chasidic Jewish
identity, all suggest a central role for education within the
community. Indeed, education is explicitly understood to be
crucial to the survival of Chasidic Judaism: it is the
87. Id.
88. 1989 N.Y. Laws, ch. 748.
89. For discussions of the decision, see Abner S. Greene, Kiryas Joel and
Two Mistakes about Equality, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1996); Christopher L.
Eisgruber, The Constitutional Value of Assimilation, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 87
(1996); Ira C. Lupu, Uncovering the Village of Kiryas Joel, 96 COLuM. L. REv.
104 (1996); Martha Minow, The Constitution and the Subgroup Question 71
INDIANA L.J. 1 (1995) [hereinafter, Minow, The Subgroup Question], see also
Judith L. Failer, The Draw and Drawbacks of Religious Enclaves in a
Constitutional Democracy: Hasidic Public Schools in Kiryas Joel, 72 INDIANA
L.J. 383 (1997), Sanford Levinson, On Political Boundary Lines,
Multiculturalism, and the Liberal State, 72 IND. L.J. 403 (1997).
90. See JEROME R. MINTz, HASmIC PEOPLE: A PLACE IN THE NEW WORLD
(1992); NEW WORLD HASIDIM (Janet S. Belcove-Shalin ed., 1995); JULEN BAUER,
LES JutFs HASSIQUES (1994).
91. N.Y. Village Law (McKinney 1973 and Supp. 1994) This particular
statute was discussed by Souter J. in Kiryas Joel. See 512 U.S. at 691.
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foundation for the traditional lives that men and women
lead, and the primary form of resistance to the outside
influences of secular society.92  As explained in an
observation of the Satmar way of life:
What concerns community leaders most is the possibility that the
exposure of the youngsters to strange people and materials may be
an avenue for undesirable acculturationb3a gap in the isolating
wall they try to build around the young...
From the state's perspective, no problem arises with
respect to these insular Satmar schools. They are privately
funded and directed, while at the same time subject to some
(even minimal) public regulation with respect to the content
and structure of education. The children in those schools do
not interact with children from other communities, and
they receive a particular religious education, invested in
identity-based isolation. At the same time, they are
understood to develop into citizens, albeit citizens who, like
their parents, lead lives characterized by Satmar beliefs,
customs and norms.
It was education for Satmar children with special needs
that triggered a conflict ending up in the Supreme Court.
These children require particular attention and resources
not provided by private Chasidic schools and teachers.
Further, like other children with disabilities and special
needs, these children are eligible for federal and state
funding for their education. In trying to meet their
particular requirements, the Satmar community
experimented with a series of consecutive arrangements.
4
At first, special education was provided by public school
teachers in a private school setting, but Supreme Court
jurisprudence suggesting that such an arrangement
constituted impermissible entanglement of state and
92. See Van Praagh, Chutzpah, supra note 23, at 208-209 (drawing on
William Shaffir, Boundaries and Self-Presentation among the Hasidim: A Study
in Identity Maintenance, in, NEW WORLD HAsIDIM: ETHNOGRAPHIC STUDIES OF
HASIDIC JEWS IN AMERICA (Janet S. Belcove-Shalin ed., 1995); see also MINTZ,
supra note 90.
93. ISRAEL RUBIN, SATMAR: AN ISLAND IN TBE CITY 150 (1972).
94. Jonathan Boyarin points out that the fight for special education within
the Satmar community reflects a growing acknowledgement, acceptance and
inclusion of Chasidic children with disabilities. See Jonathan Boyarin,




religion announced its demise to the Satmarers and the
public school district.95 The Satmar children then were sent
to public school with non-Chasidic children, where they
received their necessary special education in a mixed
setting. But the experience was not a happy one; according
to their parents, the children exhibited signs of "panic, fear
and trauma."96 In light of the unsatisfactory alternatives,
the New York State government co-operated with the
Satmar community and came up with an innovative
solution. The Kiryas Joel school district was created.
The Satmar school for Chasidic children with special
needs thus became "public" and publicly funded. The
community's children with special needs could receive
federal and state funding for special education at the same
time that they went to an all-Chasidic-yet non-
religious"- school. With respect to their non-disabled
children, the Satmarers adhere to a parallel,
denominational mode of education; with respect to their
children with special needs, they request public secular
education offered to this exclusive group of students in a
community setting. Accommodation of that request means
that their children flourish in keeping with their particular
abilities, and go to school with other Chasidic children, all
members of the community to which they fundamentally
belong.
According to the Supreme Court, this kind of
recognition is impermissible. Characterized as a "reflection
of a religious criterion for identifying the recipients of civil
authority,""8 the action of the state in trying to
accommodate and respond to the claims of the Satmar
95. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), rev'd by Agostini v. Felton,
521 U.S. 203 (1997); see also School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373
(1985), rev'd by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997). For a narrative of the
Satmar community's search for a solution. See Justice Souter's majority opinion
in Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 691-96. In her concurring opinion, O'Connor J.
suggests that the Court should reconsider that decision, saying: 'The
Establishment Clause does not demand hostility to religion, religious ideas,
religious people, or religious schools." Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 717. It seems that
both she and Kennedy J. actively desire an opportunity to reconsider decisions
that prohibit the education of children with special needs on sectarian premises.
96. Souter J. recounts this story. See Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 692.
97. In his dissent, Scalia J. insists on the fact that this is a public, non-
religious, co-ed school with non-Satmar teachers. In his view it just happens to
be that the students all share the same religion. See id. at 731-34.
98. Id. at 702.
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community smelled too strongly of religious classification
and possible religious favoritism for the majority of the
Court.99
As with the Supreme Court of Canada in Adler, the
concurring opinions offer significant variations on a theme.
While the primary concern for Souter J., writing for the
majority, is that of the neutrality of New York State's
attempted accommodation, that for Stevens J., with whom
Ginsburg and Blackmun JJ. concur, appears to be the
appropriate role and responsibility of publicly funded
education. A close examination of the expectations
expressed by the Court for the Satmar Chasidim and their
children reveals the difficult situation in which the
community is placed.
When Souter J. characterizes the school district
boundaries as explicitly constructed to exclude non-
members of the Satmar community, he makes clear that the
state is not to articulate any recognition of a religious
community's self-perceived borders, particularly when
conferring public authority over education. According to
Souter J., "there are several alternatives here for providing
bilingual and bicultural special education to Satmar
children."' What he does not admit is that the law and the
Constitution have contributed to the difficulties in finding
such alternatives and putting them into practice. Both
O'Connor J. and Kennedy J., in separate opinions,
acknowledge the hurdles inherent in the principle of anti-
establishment. O'Connor J. takes the opportunity to say
that education of disabled religious children should indeed
be permitted on sectarian premises,' and Kennedy J.
agrees that the jurisprudence forbidding such an
arrangement should be revisited.' At the same time,
however, Kennedy J. reminds us that segregation is
contrary to the purpose of the Constitution.' 3 The United
States is about the welding together of multi-racial, multi-
religious communities,'0 4 and the naming of a Chasidic
99. Note that it was the New York State School Boards Association that
brought the petition against the accommodation of the Village of Kiryas Joel.
100. Id. at 707.
101. See id. at 717.
102. See id. at 722-32.
103. See id. at 728.
104. See id. at 728-729 (Kennedy J. quoting Douglas J: "When racial or
religious lines are drawn by the State, the multiracial, multireligious
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community as a public school district contravenes that
overarching principle.
The basic message of the majority of the Court to
Kiryas Joel and New York State seems clear enough:
redraw the lines, redraft the legislation, remove the
specificity, find an alternative. This is precisely what they
did, but without success."5 But the message goes deeper,
and this may explain the failure of later attempts. When
Justice Kennedy talks about the welding together of
communities, he sends a message not only to the State
legislature about the words used in the next statute, but
more importantly to the religious community itself. After
all, the Satmarers exemplify segregation; it may not be
religiously mandated (as the Court takes pains to point
out), but it characterizes their way of life and everyday
experience.106 This brings us to the opinion of Justice
Stevens and his insistence that the state's action reflect the"strong public interest in promoting diversity and
understanding.",0 7 Instead of creating a particular school
district and thereby strengthening (in a constitutionally
impermissible way) the affiliation of young Chasidic
children to their community, New York State should have
taken on the responsibility of facilitating the learning of
disabled Satmar children in a mixed public school
communities that our Constitution seeks to weld together as one become
separatist; antagonisms that relate to race or religion rather than to political
issues are generated; communities seek not the best representative but the best
racial or religious partisan. Since that system is at war with the democratic
ideal, it should find no footing here.").
105. After the legislation in question was struck down as unconstitutional,
the New York legislature responded with new legislation. See 1994 N.Y. Laws,
ch. 241. It appeared more general and neutral but still substantively authorizes
the Kiryas Joel school district to run its special school. That law was found
unconstitutional by the New York Court of Appeals in Grumet v. Cuomo, 90
N.Y.2d 57 (1997). A third attempt in 1997 to meet the special education claims
of Kiryas Joel was struck down in Grumet v. Pataki et al., No. 06940, 1998 WL
386272 (N.Y.App. Div. July 9, 1998). The legislation was found not to be
sufficiently neutral; further it applied to so few municipalities that it could be
characterized as giving preference to Hiryas Joel.
106. An "everyday life" approach to law suggests that direct observation of
the lives of citizens and their interactions with and resistance to law provides
insights different than those obtained when looking at "law first." See Austin
Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, Beyond the Great Divide: Forms of Legal
Scholarship and Everyday Life, in LAW IN EVERYDAY LIFE 21 (Austin Sarat and
Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1995). See infra, section III(D).
107. Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 711.
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classroom. 8 In the words of Stevens J., the public schools
should have taught the Chasidic children's "schoolmates to
be tolerant and respectful of Satmar customs." 9
From the perspective of the members of Kiryas Joel, the
hope that children outside their community respect and
interact with those within it is largely irrelevant. Inclusion
of their children in a forum of tolerance and multicultural
m6lange is an external notion: well-meaning, perhaps, but
potentially threatening if it intends to pull down the walls
they have so carefully constructed. But, with the exception
of Scalia J. in dissent,"0 the Court does suggest that
publicly funded education must include the notion of school
as meeting place: a forum for mixing children from many
communities and with multiple identities."' Public funds,
and the very designation of the term "public," may not
support what otherwise look like private schools open only
to children of the Satmar community.
2
A religious community, then, cannot call upon public
funding in order to ensure that its children go to school
together. Thus, full support for its disabled children-
members of the community-will only be possible if those
children have their membership altered. They will need to
look more like non-Chasidic children with special needs,
108. See Eisgruber, supra note 89, at 93-96.
109. Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 711.
110. According to Justice Scalia, the Kiryas Joel school for children with
special needs is clearly a public, secular school; it just happens that the
students share the same religion. See id. at 732. There is a clear division and an
unresolved dispute among members of the Court as to the meaning of "public"
education in the United States. Significantly, Justice Scalia would distinguish,
for the purposes of the Establishment Clause, between giving powers to citizens
and giving powers to organized religious bodies. See id. at 732-33.
111. See Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 687-732. It is interesting to note that this
message is constantly complex and ambivalent. That is, at the same time thatmixing is deemed extremely important in public schools and, by extension, in a
liberal society, it remains possible to pay to send children (who may go on to
participate extensively in public life) to separate religious schools.
112. According to Martha Minow, the case of Kiryas Joel thus raises the
"subgroup question:" Does the legal order extend support to subgroups or force
them to choose between separatism and assimilation? The Supreme Court's
decision in Kiryas Joel fits the second alternative. The community is told that it
must choose either separatism-and refrain from exercising the statutory right
to public support for the education of children with disabilities-or else pursue
greater contact with the larger society than its use of a secular, special, local
school district receiving only Satmar children. The case suggests what the
subcommunity must give up to enjoy the rights extended to others. See MINow,
supra note 89, at 15.
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and less like Chasidic children without special needs, if
their parents and their community wish to receive financial
help for their education."' The dilemma illustrates just how
difficult it is for the law, concerned with the entanglement
of state and religion, to appreciate the real intertwining of
identities and subcommunities that these children live
with. They are Chasidic and disabled, but, it seems, they
must be primarily located in either the Chasidic community
(and private school) or in the community of children with
special needs (and public school as meeting place).
Circumventing that choice by living in a space of overlap
seems impossible, according to the Supreme Court.
The decision in Kiryas Joel tells the community that it
cannot act as an authoritative public governing body in
order to exercise full authority over its children (insofar as
their classmates and curriculum are concerned). It cannot
"be" a school district of the State of New York if it wants to
dictate the schooling and identity of its children, even if it is
separation, more than complete control that it wants. In
effect, children enrolled in such an education are recognized
neither as "citizens" of their community (a status reserved
for non-disabled children engaged in parallel private
learning) nor of the state (they do not "mix" with other
children and thus do not meet the promise of public
education). The reality of separation in the realm of the
upbringing and education of all of their children cannot be
recognized in the way the Satmar Chasidim desired.
The reality of Chasidic life means that the Satmar
Chasidim will not, and cannot, "mix!' openly. When
commentators and judges support the values of
assimilation," condemn what has been characterized as the
stunting of Chasidic children's growth as public citizens,"'
113. Although Agostini v. Felton 521 U.S. 203 (1997) overruled Aguilar v.
Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), such that public school teachers (government
employees) can be placed in parochial schools to provide remedial education to
disadvantaged children, funding for a school for religious disabled children (as
requested in Kiryas Joel) is not explicitly envisaged.
114. Eisgruber concludes his article by saying that "dissident and
mainstream sub-communities confront one another within the public arena"
and that "[tihese encounters will tend to assimilate most (but not all)
contending sub-communities into a more general society founded upon
principles which, one hopes, are better than what any of the communities could
have produced on its own." Eisgruber, supra note 89, at 103.
115. Failer suggests that segregation of Satmar disabled children "stunts
their growth as citizens." Failer, supra note 89, at 401.
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or question whether the state should "permit" such a
community to exercise authority in order to strengthen
cohesion,"' they fail to grapple with the particular and
comprehensive world view that not only characterizes the
Chasidic community but also refuses to ask for state
approval. For the Chasidim, it is important that
negotiations and administrative arrangements with state-
level authority continue but, at the same time, do not erode
a significant sense of autonomy."7 When the United States
Supreme Court perceives the boundaries around the
community as either impenetrable (allowing for separate
living and learning) or as soluble (insisting on the mingling
of disabled children), it fails to catch a glimpse of what the
Kiryas Joel case provides: a picture of a complex and
constantly shifting set of relations between state and
community law, norms, and powers."8
D. Multicultural Living and Learning
The final moment of conflict to be examined comes in the
form of a story. Neither transformed by litigation nor
embodied in Supreme Court appellate jurisprudence, the
story of Emilie Ouimet, a Muslim girl in Montreal,
provoked intense controversy and public debate and
provides perhaps the most complex and challenging model
for the education of a religious community's children."9
116. See id. at 391. Throughout her work, Failer focuses on the question of
whether the liberal state can or should allow enclave education.
117. See generally Greene, supra note 89 (discussing the concept of
"permeable sovereignty" exercised by groups like the Satmar Chasidim).
118. See Van Praagh, supra note 23, at 199-202 (discussing the "boundaries"
around the Chasidic Jewish communities of Montreal). "The markers that
delineate the Chasidic Jews ... are thus physical, cultural and religious." Id. at
201. In the conclusion to this article, I suggest that the boundaries are not so
obvious.
Not only do we have difficulty in tracing the location and lines of the
boundaries but we need to continually shift our understanding of what
those boundaries are for, of what roles they play, and what purposes
they serve. They can be perceptual structures that help those on either
side define and create themselves; they can be heavy doors to shut out
the noise and smell and activity of both sides; they can even be bridges
where people and communities rooted on either side can meet even if
only for a few moments.
Id. at 213.
119. See Jeremy Webber, Multiculturalism and the Limits to Toleration, in
LANGUAGE, CULTURE AND VALUES IN CANADA AT THE DAWN OF THE 21ST
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Here we are confronted with a community of school children
who embrace the notion of mixing with others in the
classroom as long as they can also assert their religious
identity. The kind of boundary invested in by the Satmarers
of Kiryas Joel has no place in this story. Instead, we find
that, rather than opting for exit, or pursuing the route of
separate schools, religious children may go to public school
prepared to participate at the same time that they claim
the promises of multiculturalism.
In September 1994, twelve-year-old Emilie Ouimet
arrived at Louis Riel Polyvalent in Montreal wearing a
hijab, a veil or scarf that covers a Muslim girl's or woman's
head and neck. Citing the strict dress code of the high
school-a code that prohibited any clothes or accessories
that would marginalize a student-the principal sent
Emilie home, forbidding her to return with the hijab on her
head. Emilie switched to another school. Reported in the
Montreal press, 2 ' Emilie's story initiated a loud and fervent
discussion in Quebec through polls, editorials, conferences,
classroom debates, positions expressed by the Quebec
Human Rights Commission, the Quebec Council on the
Status of Women, and the Quebec Teachers' Union,' and
academic analyses.
A handful of principal arguments or approaches gave
shape to the discussion. It was argued that the hijab
signifies sexual inequality and the oppression and coercion
of women, and therefore has no place in public schools in a
society committed to gender equality.' On the other hand,
CENTURY 269, 169-270 (Andre Lapierre et al. eds., 1996); CoNSEIL Du STATUT DE
LAFEMME, supra note 10, at 7; and McAndrew and Pag4, supra note 10, at 1-2.
120. See Frangois Berger, Elve expulsde de son dcole parce qu'elle portait le
foulard islamique, LA PRESSE, Sept. 9, 1994, at Al; Francois Berger, L'@ldve au
voile islamique ira dans une autre 6cole, LA PRESSE, Sept. 10, 1994, at A3; Jean-
Hugues Roy, Ces femmes Voilges, VOIR, Sept. 22-28 1994, at 7-8; Paul Wells,
Wearing Hijab a Personal Choice: Muslim Spokesman, THE GAZET rE (Montreal),
Sept. 23, 1994, at A5; Frangois Berger, Les Qudbcois sont divisds sur le port du
voile islamique, L& PPESSE (Montreal), Sept. 23, 1994, at A3; Isabelle Par6,
Landry veut un debat sur les symbols religieux & l'cole, LE DEVOIR (Montreal),
Oct. 26, 1994, at Al.
121. See McAndrew & Pag6, supra note 10; QUEBEC HUMAN RIGHTS
COMAISSION, supra note 10; CONSEIL Du STATUT DE LA FEMME, supra note 10, at
33 (noting a poll conducted shortly after the event was publicized showed that
50% of the Quebec population favored allowing girls to wear the hijab, while
38% were opposed).
122. See CONSEIL Du STATUT DE LA FEMmE, supra note 10, at 9-17
(discussing the kind of argument in the report of the Conseil du statut de la
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individual freedom of conscience and religion was invoked
in support of the individual choice of Muslim girls and
young women to wear the hijab if their beliefs so compel
them." Also discernable was a response grounded in a
strongly secular vision of public schools and citizenship;
influenced by France and its approach to the wearing of the
hijab," this argument insisted that public schools should
make no space for external signs of religious (and
particularly fundamentalist) belief and practice.
Emilie Ouimet lodged no official complaint, nor was any
legal action initiated. It is important to note, however, the
central role in the debate of individual rights guaranteed by
the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms.' The
Quebec Charter provides for freedom of conscience and
religion, 7 the right to equal recognition, 8 and the right to
free public education. 9 Particularly in the report issued by
the Quebec Human Rights Commission in response to the
controversy, the question of the hijab in public school was
explored and resolved in the context of these rights
guarantees. According to the Commission, banning the
hijab or transferring students who insist on wearing it
femme). Note that the contemporary coverage of women in Algeria forced to
wear the hijab, and punished or even killed for refusing. See, e.g., Algerian
Women Defy Militants, Crying "Neither Veil Nor Robe," TIB GAZETTE
(Montreal), Sept. 3, 1994, at Al.
123. See QUEBEC HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, supra note 10, at 32-41.
124. For a discussion on the hijab in France see Eva Steiner, The Muslim
Scarf and the French Republic, 6 KING'S C.L.J. 147 (1995-96); Michele Aulagnon
& Philippe Bernard, Cinq ans de poldmique, LE MONDE (Paris), Sept. 21, 1994,
at 13; P. Bertrand, Francois Bayrou souhaite l'interdiction des 'signes
ostentatoires' & l'dcole publique, LE MONDE (Paris), Sept. 21, 1994, at 13.
125. See Jeremy Webber, Multiculturalism and the Limits to Toleration, in
LANGUAGE, CULTURE AND VALUES IN CANADA AT TIIE DAWN OF THE 21ST
CENTURY 269 (Andr6 Lapierre et al. eds., 1996) (discussing the controversy and
its implication in the general questions regarding cultural accommodation).
Webber highlights the unique facets of the debate in Quebec, describing them
as "strongly influenced by Quebeckers' familiarity with and participation in
French intellectual life." Id. at 270. First he describes the French "republican"
notion of citizenship adhered to by some in Quebec and, second, he points out
the "typically French concern with Islamic fundamentalism." Id. at 271. Note,
however, that public schools in Quebec may be denominational (e.g. Montreal
Catholic School Commission, Protestant School Commission of Greater
Montreal) and yet open to all regardless of religion.
126. R.S.Q., c. C-12 [hereinafter "Quebec Charter"].
127. See id. at §3.
128. See id. at §10.
129. See id. at §40.
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would constitute discrimination and any attempt to justify
such measures would require concrete evidence of a real
threat to sexual equality or to safety.3 ° In the absence of
such justification, the Commission came out strongly
against the prohibition of the hijab, and its reliance on the
Quebec Charter seemed particularly persuasive as the
immediacy and intensity of the debate died down in the
early months of 1995.
The emphasis on the rights of individual Muslim girl
students should stand in contrast to the three preceding
case studies. Here, unlike in Yoder, Adler, or Kiryas Joel,
the focus is on a particular child rather than on her
parents. We actually meet an adolescent who expresses her
beliefs and views in a particular way, and whose personal
education is at stake. Instead of existing as an invisible, if
important, piece of the picture, Emilie was front and center
in the discussion and disagreement about the hijab. The
implications of the discussion went beyond her individual
case, but it is significant that an individual young 3person
made herself heard and initiated a loud controversy.
Reference to the rights of individuals like Emilie
Ouimet may have persuaded many observers of the story
and its aftermath,'" but the picture of an independent or
130. See QUEBEC HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, supra note 10, at 39-40. The
report of the CONSEIL Du STATUT DE LA FEMME reached a similar conclusion. See
CONSEI Du STATUT DE LA FEMME, supra note 10. The kind of situation
envisaged is one whereby a Muslim girl would not be able to participate in a
science lab experiment, for example. It is taken for granted that science labs or
physical education classes would be participated in by all students.
131. Given this observation that Emilie made herself "heard" when she
insisted on wearing a hijab, it is interesting to note that the analysis did not
focus on Emilie's freedom of expression (guaranteed by section 3 of the Quebec
Charter). It seems likely that, if it had happened in the United States, the hijab
controversy would raise issues of the rights of children and adolescents to free
speech. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969), in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a school board's decision to
suspend students for wearing armbands in protest of the Vietnam War violated
their First Amendment right to freedom of expression. In Canada, the Supreme
Court has yet to consider explicitly the rights to free expression of young people,
although, in recently commenting on the scope and limitations of the
fundamental rights of children in schools, the Court held that the rights of
children in primary and secondary schools are circumscribed by the school's
responsibility for providing a safe school environment and maintaining order
and discipline in the school. R. v. M.R.M., [19981 S.C.J. No. 83 (QL).
132. See Kymlicka, Ddmocratie, in PLURALISME, CITOYENNETE & EDUCATION,
supra note 39, at 34-35 (discussing "polyethnic rights"); see also KYMLICKA,
MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP, supra note 15. The language of rights is strong
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autonomous adolescent girl making choices about religious
expression and exercising her guaranteed freedoms misses
the crucial element of community. The connections between
Muslim girls in public schools and their religious
communities are downplayed, and the claims of those
communities with respect to education are muffled. This
may partly be due to the fact that the Islamic community in
Montreal is ethnically and culturally diverse such that it
defies any tangible geographic or institutional borders. 33
Unlike the Amish or the Chasidim, the community to which
Muslim girls belong is not demarcated in any visible or
concrete way. Indeed, this "community" defined by religious
faith is a mix of groups characterized by different countries
of origin, languages and customs.
This picture of religious community poses particular
challenges. Instead of grappling with the question of how to
respond to the professed insularity or desired separate
schooling of a small community of faith, the state is asked
to recognize a diffuse set of communities, the norms and
practices of which transcend state borders. Instead of
confronting barriers erected around a community, public
education is forced to confront the phenomenon of a
personal "barrier" in the form of the hijab, meant to
demarcate the individual. Muslim girls may explicitly
identify themselves, and concretely signal their religious
adherence and affiliation, by wearing a visible personal veil.
At the same time that they place a literal and figurative
boundary around their person, these girls intend to
participate fully in the classroom and in public life more
generally."M
and often compelling, but my emphasis is on how the individuals involved live
out their affiliations to overlapping communities.
133. Some background information provides context: Quebec schools may be
public and, at the same time, confessional. See QUEBEC HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMISSION, supra note 10, at 30-31. The Muslim community in Quebec
numbers approximately 45,000 (out of a population of 7 million): members come
from Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia, with the most prominent
countries of origin being Lebanon, Egypt, and Morocco. In Montreal, there were,
in 1994-1995, approximately 3,600 Muslim students (about 4% of the student
population); approximately 70 Muslim girls wore the hijab to school. See
CONSEIL DU STATUT DE LA FEMME, supra note 10, at 28-29.
134. See Naheed Mustafa, My Body is My Own Business, THE GLOBE AND
MAIL (Toronto), June 29, 1993, at A26; Paul Wells, Wearing Hijab a Personal
Choice: Muslim Spokesman, THE GAZETTE (Montreal), Sept. 23, 1994, at A5. But
see Catherine Meckes, Wearing a Uniform of Oppression, THE GLOBE AND MAIL
(Toronto), July 5, 1993, at A12; Daniel Baril, II serait narf de considrer le
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The resultant challenge to liberal notions of the state
and of education is, in some ways, more difficult than those
posed by a religious school board, separate school funding,
or exemption from education guidelines on religious
grounds. Instead of focusing on the external shape and
structure of education from the vantage point of the state
or, alternatively, of religious communities, we are invited
through the front doors of the school into the classroom.
There, we are forced to reexamine the notions of mixing
(dictated by the Court in Kiryas Joel), multicultural
harmony (the underlying message of Adler), and citizenship
through education (the Yoder model for everyone but the
Amish). What does multicultural mixing entail, demand, or
make room for? The answer must incorporate a response to
the more immediate question of what the hijab signifies
when worn by female students who sit in public school
classrooms every day.
No definitive or absolute meaning can be ascribed to the
hijab.3 5 For Emilie Ouimet, perhaps the hijab offered a
strong sense of identity, perhaps it was meant to remind
her constantly of her religious beliefs, perhaps it was partly
meant as an adolescent challenge to the authority of the
school administration. More generally, the hijab may
represent (to both its wearers and viewers) religious faith,
extremist politics, gender inequality, cultural identity, and
solidarity with other Muslim women-all at the same time.
These girls belong to their particular religious and cultural
communities and may well feel compelled to wear the hijab
because of their membership in, and allegiance to, their
families and religious faith. In this sense, they may not feel
that they make a choice free from influence and constraint.
They also belong to a community-and its school system-
which defines itself as open, liberal, diverse, and committed
to individual rights, freedoms, and autonomy.
By asserting themselves as members of multiple
communities, girls attending public school who wear the
hidjab comme un simple symbol religieux, LA PRESSE (Montreal), Sept. 28, 1994,
atB3.
135. It is, of course, possible to try to ascertain the meaning of the hijab by
asking what Islamic law requires, recommends, or leaves open to its adherents.
In the context of the analysis that I offer, however, it does not matter how the
Koran should be interpreted: that is, the discourse about the hijab in public
schools does not turn on the answer in Islamic law, even if the secular legal
system tried to investigate religious precepts, rules, and obligations.
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hijab question both a concept of religious communities as
insular or separate authoritative structures, and a notion of
public education as an homogenizing structure within
which difference is rendered irrelevant and invisible. The
hijab signifies a continuously permeable boundary,
capturing the fluid interactions that can characterize the
relations between religious community and state. This,
then, is the fourth model for understanding religious
communities, education, and the state. It is perhaps the
hardest to articulate because, in incorporating so many
possible claims and symbols of religious identity in a
secular society, its contours are so fuzzy. It is also perhaps
the most significant as it faces head-on the reality of
diversity in a shared learning space.
The saga of the hijab ended quietly without any final
decision as to an absolute meaning of multiculturalism and
the limits to toleration."6 No directive emerged on behalf of
either school boards or the provincial government: some
Muslim girls wear the hijab to public school and some do
not. The hijab story highlights what is for these
communities the crucial guarantee that the hijab wearer
will be entitled to learn and participate and flourish
alongside her non-hijab-wearing classmates.'37 For the
pluralist Muslim community in Quebec, membership and
adherence are not necessarily threatened when its children
go to public (even confessional) integrated schools, 3 8 as long
as the girls, in particular, can express and present
themselves as Muslim in some significant way. Although
some Muslims may argue that separate religious schools
are necessary to identity formation and development, and
136. "Multiculturalism and the Limits to Toleration" is the title of Jeremy
Webber's discussion of, inter alia, the hijab controversy. Webber contrasts the
discourse and resolution of the hijab issue with that of female genital
mutilation. See Webber, supra note 119.
137. See McAndrew & Pag6, supra note 10, at 15: "[L'dcole] respecte les
identitds distinctives et elle contribue a cr6er ainsi un contexte ou les jeunes
sont en contact avec une diversit6 de modes de vie... les individus
d'appartenance diverses sont 6duquds A vivre en interdependance dans des
institutions communes." Id.
138. I remind the reader that, in Quebec, Catholic and Protestant schools
may be public and open to anyone: Muslim girls may attend Catholic public
school, for example. Note, however, that Quebec is currently in the process of
replacing its confessional school system with a linguistic system whereby there
will be English-language and French-language school boards.
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thus reject mixing in the classroom,' those who choose
public schools are not necessarily any less dedicated to
fostering the religious identity of their children.
According to this picture, the membership of students
in their communities-sometimes explicitly displayed by
their clothing or practices-can be recognized without
diminishing the state's involvement in, and influence over,
education. At the same time, that involvement and
influence will be adjusted on an ongoing basis. School, as
the public sphere for children, will adapt to the needs of its
participants, thereby engaging in a constant exploration of
what multiculturalism makes possible in practice. This
model raises an obvious multi-faceted question. If diverse
values, beliefs, and practices attached to school children are
to be expressed in the classroom,14 ° what are the
consequences for the content and structure of curriculum,
pedagogical approaches, the development of ideas, and the
exploration of secular liberal values?"
Rather than trying to provide a general theoretical set
of answers to this constant query as to the meaning of
multiculturalism in the education of children, it may be
preferable to ask concrete questions about the steps taken
by educators and administrators in response to issues
ranging from the wearing of the hijab or the kirpan,"' to
requested exemption from classes on sex education, to the
absence from school for religious holidays.' As institutions
139. See SWEET, supra note 57, at 75-80. In her book Sweet interviews a
principal from a Muslim school who points out that separation in the schools
does not preclude interaction in the neighborhood: "When we leave the school,
we mix with those people" Id. at 79.
140. In referring to diversity within the classroom, I do not accept, and
indeed, would refute, the notion that communities and community affiliations
remain static in their form and substance. The notion of recognition, then, does
not entail fixing a particular picture of a community and its members in time
and space.
141. With respect to the value of "citizenship education" in a liberal, diverse
society, Will Kymlicka is quoted as saying: "To learn public reasonableness,
students must come to know and understand people who are reasonable and
decent and human but who do not share their religion." SWEET, supra note 57,
at 247. That learning is obviously most possible in mixed public schools.
142. See, e.g., Peel Bd. of Educ. v. Ontario Human Rights Comm'n, [1991] 3
O.R. (3d) 531 (Div. Ct.)(upholding a Commission finding that the prohibition of
the kirpan, or ceremonial Sikh dagger, on school property was discriminatory
and that accommodation subject to safety restrictions was called for).
143. See Marie McAndrew, Diversitg culturelle et religieuse: divergence des
rh~toriques, convergences des pratiques. McAndrew discusses the ideologies of
1384 [Vol. 47
1999] EDUCATION OF RELIGIOUS CHILDREN
adjust and accommodate, at the same time articulating
their reasons for doing so, their actions may provide a
blueprint for further discussion at a more general level. If
they refuse to respond to particular claims, thereby defining
the limits on their flexibility, that too provides signposts for
mapping out the content of multiculturalism.
Paying attention to what actually happens in schools is
perhaps the most fruitful pathway to explore in pursuit of
the elusive details of a "multicultural model" of education
for religious children. It is also a pathway that corresponds
to an "everyday life" approach to the study of law and its
impact.' That is, the ordinary experiences and decisions
that take place in schools every day, week and year, can
reveal the interactions of family, community, and religion
in the lives of real people, and can form the basis for an
emerging picture of what the reality of diversity requires.
Further, although an approach invested in the everyday
initially seems removed from the study of law, the practices
of schools can serve to formulate norms that undergird law
just as much as law is usually understood to ground those
practices.'
By investigating and digesting a story like that of
Emilie Ouimet and other Muslim girls like her, society
learns about itself in a profound way. Theories of the liberal
state may attempt to articulate their commitment to some
principle of multiculturalism, but experience and
experimentation are needed to flesh out the notion. Indeed,
looking for definitions of multiculturalism in state
documents and even constitutions 6 is largely futile: the
"multiculturalism" and "interculturalism," and the way in which Quebec
discourse has rejected the former as "Canadian," while adopting the latter as
capable of promoting a shared public culture. Id. at 291-95. She then compares
practices and decisions reflected in the day-to-day administration of public
schools in five Canadian provinces, and finds striking similarities despite the
apparent theoretical differences. See id. at 304-11.
144. See Sarat and Kearns, supra note 106.
145. See id. at 55. "The risk has to be taken to immerse ourselves in the
study of the everyday world that at first glance has no legal content. We must
study families, schools, workplaces... ; we will find instances where law both
constitutes practice and is a tool for changing practice. We will find law shaping
relations and interceding to alter relations." Id. at 60.
146. See Canadian Multiculturalism Act R.S.C., ch. 24 (4th Supp.) (1985)
(Can.). The Multiculturalism Act is an "Act for the preservation and
enhancement of multiculturalism in Canada." Id. It is a Federal act, which
promotes multiculturalism in Canada. See also Canada Act s.27 (1982),
Canadian Charter (stating that "this Charter shall be interpreted in a manner
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principle only comes into focus as we work out its
implications in schools, neighborhoods, and a wide range of
societal interactions and institutions, including those of
law. Frameworks that operate at political, constitutional
and state law levels need to be informed by small everyday
stories of real people, rather than the other way around.
This last model stems from a child's behavior and
needs. But it implicates families and communities just as
much as do the co-existing three models previously
described. In declining to follow the example of the
principal of Emilie's school, Quebec society (embodied in
school boards, teachers' unions, a human rights
commission, and public opinion) accepts the open and
continuing challenge presented to it by religious
communities who insist that their children explicitly
maintain multiple affiliations and identities. Recognizing
religious identities and ways of life in a liberal state means
more than finding special space for religious communities to
exist, or coming up with particular arrangements tailored
to the context and community in question. As the hijab
discourse indicates, it also means deep self-reflection for the
state on the organic integration of diversity into the
meaning of citizenship and education.
IV. KIDS, CONSTITUTIONS, AND COMMUNITIES
The four case studies of Yoder, Adler, Kiryas Joel and
the hijab illustrate significantly different ways of sending
the children of religious communities to school in a
contemporary liberal and pluralist society. These four
alternative pictures of education for religious children co-
exist, even if they are not fully compatible. No one model
captures fully the needs, claims, and limits articulated
either by the religious community in question or the state
with which it interacts. Instead, each combines
constitutional or rights-based mechanisms with community
perspectives to create particular learning opportunities for
children. The stakeholders identified above in Part 1I-the
institutions of state, family and community-are all
represented in the particular understanding of education
and religious children embodied in each model. Looking
consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage
of Canadians").
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primarily to constitutions and even to communities in order
to make decisions affecting children's lives is mirrored by
the way in which a focus on children themselves sheds light
on our "constitution" as members of the state and of diverse
communities within it.
A comparison of the constitutional mechanisms at play
indicates the way in which guarantees of rights shape the
relationship between the constitutional framework in
question and the communities, families and children
affected. In Yoder, the individual right to free exercise of
religion, held by a parent, served to bring the story of the
Old Order Amish to the Supreme Court of the United
States. In delineating the scope of that parental right, the
Court exempted Amish children from mandatory education
meant to instill shared values and a sense of citizenship in
all American children. In the Canadian case of Adler,
parents argued that their individual freedom of religion
should allow them to send their children to the religious
schools of their choice, funded by the province; in addition,
they argued that their right to equality had been infringed
given the asymmetrical recognition of the Roman Catholic
community in Ontario. When the Canadian Supreme Court
refused these claims, it indicated that neither religious
freedom nor equality rights guaranteed the education
scheme proposed by the litigants.
At stake in Kiryas Joel was the anti-establishment
clause of the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution: an outsider to the community challenged the
state's creation of a school district as impermissible
entanglement with religion. No Satmarer parent or child
claimed individual rights as the basis of an argument for
state-funded private schooling. Rather, the communal
actions and political victories of their Satmar village were
deemed contrary to the American constitutional
commitment to the separation of church and state. In the
final example of the hijab controversy, the contours of
cultural conflict and clash, rather than of constitutional
interpretation, were more explicit than they might have
been had the case gone to court. At the same time, however,
the deciding factor in persuading the Quebec Human Rights
Commission to come out strongly against the banning of the
hijab was the Quebec Charter's commitment to, and
guarantee of, the individual freedom-in these
circumstances exercised by children-of religion and
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conscience.
The rights and freedoms argued and elucidated in these
four case studies are understood to constitute a particular
society's understanding of itself and its constituents: they
are, after all, embodied in Constitutions or Charters.147 The
historical differences between Canada and the United
States may help explain the distinctions in the way these
states understand the relationship between religion and
government. The birth of the United States occurred
through a revolution in which the rupture of ties to
England and its established church was celebrated.
Canada, however, developed out of a British settlement
that struggled in its early years to maintain and preserve
its Anglo-French culture and tradition. 148 Although the
contours of church-state division are different in Canada
and the United States, both states are clearly secular and
recognize the religious plurality of their respective societies.
As the four models presented in this work exemplify, this
recognition has allowed religious communities in both
Canada and the United States to make claims with respect
to the education of their children, thereby expressing their
religious values and traditions to the state. The particular
147. This analysis of the interplay between constitutions and religious
communities highlights the historical and political features of Canada and the
United States. Although both nations properly view themselves as secular
states, there are important differences in their respective religious cultures. For
an example of the blur between secular and religious education in Canada, see
A.J. MENENDEZ, CHURCH AND STATE IN CANADA 47 (1996); also see, supra note
60 and accompanying text, and the fact that the Canadian constitution lacks an
explicit ban on religious establishment, may portray Canada as a non-
secularized state. However, most Canadians view themselves as members of a
secularized society where there is an implicit recognition of the right to freedom
of conscious and religion. This freedom received constitutional status when the
Canadian Charter came into force in 1982.
The division between religion and government is not as stark, however, as it
appears in the U.S. context. The preambles of the Canadian Bill of Rights and
the Charter affirm that "Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the
supremacy of God and the rule of law," suggesting that state governance and
religion are, to some degree, intertwined. Menendez, CHURCH AND STATE at 105-
07. In contrast, the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution contains an
explicit ban on the establishment of a state religion, and affirms that the state
may not interfere with an individual's free exercise of religion. See supra note
60. These principles ensure that "government may not make judgements about
the value or disvalue.., of religions or religious practices or religious
(theological) tenants as such (i.e., religious)," M.J. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS;
CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL PERSPECTIVES 14 (1997).
148. Id. at 125-26.
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constitutional rights at stake have not been the focus of
discussion in this paper. Instead, the analysis has centered
on normative communities and their interaction with the
state, through the education of children. Significantly, no
constitutional mechanism explicitly allows religious
communities to articulate their notions of childhood,
membership, and co-existence, in either Canada or the
United States. As we have seen, however, this does not
mean that those communities are neither heard nor spoken
to. Indeed, when the law of the state offers an authoritative
resolution to a conflict (such as that found in Yoder, Kiryas
Joel, Adler, and the hijab debate), it speaks directly to
religious communities and illustrates the state's
comprehension of the communities that reside within it and
transcend its borders.
A comparative summary of the constitutional
mechanisms thus belongs side-by-side with a comparative
survey of the impact of each case study on the religious
communities involved. The four case studies show us what
communities learn about the state's perspective on
themselves and on their child members. In Yoder, the
United States Supreme Court tells the Amish that the
children clearly belong to them. Education is understood to
prepare children for lives as participating adult citizens
who exercise individual choices, and the Old Order Amish
need have nothing to do with it for their children after the
age of fourteen. Adler acknowledges that, in Canada,
children can belong to a religious community and at the
same time have access to public resources for their separate
education. They can go to religious schools and, at the same
time, be full participants in secular life and government
budgets. And yet, as the Canadian Supreme Court points
out, this is not the case for all religious communities, or
even for those most determined to invest in this model;
rather, according to the majority of the Court, it is a
particular historical piece of the country's constitutional
development. In Kiryas Joel, the Satmar Chasidic
community is determined to keep its control over its
children, despite the Supreme Court's admonishment that
disabled Satmar children who need public resources and
support cannot fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of a
Chasidic village school district. Public education dollars
seem to require open, mixed public schools or, at least, non-
religious administration of the education system and
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learning environment. With respect to the hijab, the
Islamic community in Montreal hears the state's questions
about the significance and implications of the hijab and
feels the state's somewhat uneasy and conditional
acceptance of explicit religious identity in the classroom.
Despite the different constitutional frameworks,
traditions, and arrangements with respect to education in
the United States and Canada, the messages to religious
communities who want recognition and even funding of
their particular educational requirements share significant
elements. That is, similarly conceived and constructed
notions of freedom of religion and of citizenship in a liberal,
diverse state inform the models found in the three Supreme
Court case studies. As both Courts seem to suggest, the
children of a society truly dedicated to diversity and
tolerance can belong, subject to certain limitations, both to
particular religious communities and to the state-based
society in which they live and learn. This picture of
multiple membership is itself multiple, as we have seen.
Not only do the Supreme Court decisions reflect the
complicated arrangements that either satisfy or fail to meet
the requirements of constitutionally permissible education,
but the hijab controversy highlights perhaps most
effectively the complex links among learning, religious
identity, and public life. Children whose identity is
fundamentally pluralist can and do find ways to indicate
that identity both to themselves and to those around them.
While the religious communities to which children belong
are determined to hold onto them in meaningful ways,
those communities may not insist upon private or publicly
funded sectarian schools. Instead, when the Islamic
community receives even informal assurances that the
hijab will be permitted in schools attended by Muslim girls,
that community understands that it can continue to work
out the implications of sending their children to a mixed
learning environment while still insisting that those
children remember their religious affiliation.
Each model is derived from what might be termed a
"defining moment" with respect to religion and education in
the United States or Canada; each embodies distinctive
interactions among state, religious community and
children. In sending messages to each religious community,
at stake, the legal discourse of contemporary North
American secular society carves out space for religious life
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and learning in a variety of ways. Although it might be
desirable and satisfying to deduce a unifying theme or set of
values expressed through those messages, a complete
response to the question of how the liberal state "sees"
religion and education is neither possible nor appropriate.
The endeavor to produce such a response is understandable
and, indeed, often seems to be central to the discussion of
the contours of liberalism when confronted with the
challenge of diversity." Particularly in the realms of
constitutional law and of political philosophy, discussion
revolves around the nature, actions, and claims of the state
and state institutions including law.
Investigating what the legal system of the state permits
with respect to religious communities and the education of
religious children is indeed important and can be
illuminating. But the perspective is necessarily partial. In
working from the vantage point of the secular law of the
liberal state, our understanding of the relationship between
state and communities tends to be unidirectional and thus
incomplete. Expectations, then, of the kinds of answers that
such an investigation can produce are left unmet. Those
expectations are shifted, however, if we include in our
investigation the internal vantage point of the religious
communities themselves. 0  As we have seen, the
perspectives of religious communities in each of the models
examined above tell us about the state and its self-
perception, perhaps with even more insight than do the
claims and pronouncements of state law. The contributions
of religious communities to the unfolding of the four stories
retold here, together with the consequences for those
communities of the resolutions to those stories, serve to
inform our understanding of states and their constitutional
guideposts. Delineating the meaning and scope of
constitutional rights, then, takes place in the context of the
interactional framework that brings together religious
149. See the articles published in vol. 4(1) and 4(2) of LEETON. See also
KYMLCKA, LIBERALISM, supra note 15; KYMUCKA, MULTICULTURAL CIZENSHIP,
supra note 15; CHARLES TAYLOR, MUUTICULTURALISM AND 'T7HE POLITICS OF
RECOGNITION" (1992). In the context of education in particular, see GUTMANN,
DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION, supra note 36; see also Bourgeault & Pietrantonio,
L'ecole dans une societe pluraliste, in PLURALISME, CITOYENNETE & EDUCATION,
supra note 14; Failer, supra note 89; Gutmann, Paternalism, supra note 36.
150. See Greene, supra note 89; Sarat and Kearns, supra note 106; Van
Praagh, Chutzpah supra note 23.
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communities and the liberal state.
Instead of articulating an overarching way in which the
state defines or situates religious communities and their
child members, a combination of an "external" or state-
initiated perspective with an "internal" or community-
centered perspective suggests a methodology or pathway for
pursuing answers to crucial questions. If we want to know
what constitutes "recognition" of religious communities, 5' if
we want to try to combine the ideal of bringing diverse
children together in a mixed milieu with multiculturalism's
promise of respect for behaviors and beliefs specific to
religious and cultural communities, if we want to explore
not only the structure of schooling but the curriculum and
content of a child's education, then we need to move back
and forth in our point of view. We need to try to follow the
constantly shifting interactions between the liberal state
and the multiple normative communities that live within
and alongside it. We do so by examining each story or
situation with attention to the voices of the individual and
collective participants-whether the Yoder parents, the
Kiryas Joel village administrators, the Adler children, or
Muslim girls in Montreal, some of whom wear the hijab.
Insisting on the significance of the community's role in
the models of education explored in this paper brings to
light the way in which religious parents, children, and the
communities to which they belong are not passive recipients
of constitutional interpretation and state action. Rather,
they participate actively in creating, resisting and even
defying the constitutional and educational arrangements in
which they are situated. At the same time that the state
attempts to articulate its goals and dreams with respect to
the children who will become adult citizens and
participants, those objectives are constantly shaped by
counter-influences emanating from diverse sources.
Locating children in the context of education, then, is a
complex task that pushes us beyond the parameters of any
one of the institutions of state, community, and family. As
education is defined and directed, children are shared
among competing, conflicting, or co-operating actors and
influences. Conversely, children themselves, their schools,
and the content of their education in the classroom,
necessitate interactions among communities, their
151. TAYLOR, supra note 149; see Leydet, supra note 15, at 103-07.
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members, and the state that would not otherwise take
place. We follow the children, then, as we engage in ongoing
description and assessment of the diverse liberal state.
V. CONCLusIoN-"ALL WE'vE GOT"
152
In Philip Roth's fictional dialogue between secular Peck
and traditional Tzuref, Peck asserts that the people made
the law. "We make the law.... It is our community. These
are [our] neighbors."153 From the perspective of a secular
state, that must be right. The people make the law, interact
as neighbors, create, and sustain their communities. And
the people are understood to insist upon, and be protected
by, constitutional guarantees of fundamental rights and
freedoms. When conflicts arise (as in the cases of Yoder,
Kiryas Joel, Adler, and the hijab), the law of the state-and
its corresponding constitution-pronounces upon the
problem and offers an authoritative answer. In response,
Tzuref denies that the people make the law. He insists on
God and the heart as the source, and rejects what he sees
as the shame of human-made rules and norms, and, in
doing so, gives us a glimpse of a religious community's
perspective. Tzuref reminds us that an effective
understanding of communities and the education of
religious children demands not only an inquiry into what
the legal system of the state allows, but also careful
attention to the normative universe of the particular
religious community at stake.
The encounter between Peck and Tzuref also includes a
telling exchange over the stranger's distinctive religious
garb. In response to Peck's insistence that the man in black
dress in a more appropriate manner, Tzuref reminds us
that the black suit is "all he's got."'54 Similarly, the Amish
way of life is all the community's got; the sense that their
children must attend a Jewish school is all the Adlers have;
the impossibility of mixing with non-Satmar children is all
the Kiryas Joel community knows; and the ongoing
discussion and dynamic over the hijab is all its Muslim
wearers and non-wearers have. The state can disagree,
prohibit, direct, and encourage those beliefs and behaviors
152. ROTH, supra note 1, at 189.
153. Id. at 192
154. Id. at 189.
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but, in the end, the communities and their members may
not be willing or, in fact, able to find an alternative suit to
wear. In other words, the state may encourage integration
and the fostering of civic virtues and values, and may allow
for and even subsidize some form of parallel or separate
learning. It may also insist on intermingling of children in
some situations, but, in the end, the internal teachings and
practices of the religious communities will play as
important a role as the state in directing the education of
their shared children.
What is it, then, that the state has? What costume does
it wear? Instead of debating the potential of multicultural
policy, or asking ourselves whether or not we believe in
multiculturalism, or trying to articulate and control the
meaning of multiculturalism, it seems that the reality of
multicultural diversity is the requisite garb of the
contemporary liberal state.'55 But we don't know precisely
what that outfit looks like yet; no pattern has been cut out,
no one material selected, no details specified. Instead,
schools will be one of the institutions that tell us what
multiculturalism means as students, parents, communities
and administrators come together in an educational
context. The model inspired by the hijab controversy is
perhaps the most effective in illustrating this process.
It is true that each model, as I have pointed out, exists
in a diverse liberal state and, indeed, the three first models
are more clear-cut than the fourth in the degree of
recognition or respect offered to religious communities. The
clarity of the first three models-citizenship and civic
virtues, parallel sectarian learning, meeting place-arises
from the fact that the particular religious communities
make sharp claims as to their place in the picture. That is,
they argue that responding to their religious needs and
beliefs entails exemption, funding, or separation. The lines
are nowhere near so stark in the fourth model. But, while
the hijab story may be the messiest in terms of discerning
the precise claims of the religious children and their
155. See Daniel Weinstock, Droits Collectifs et libdralisme, in PLURALISME,
CrrOYENNET. & tDUCATION, supra note 11, at 53-78 (suggesting that we focus
on the fact of pluralism; that is, rather than try to justify multiculturalism on
the basis of the fostering of autonomy, we should simply recognize our
multicultural reality in a reasonable way). McAndrew, points out that, whether
we call this "multiculturalism" or "interculturalism" (as in Quebec), the
challenges and reality remain the same. See supra note 10.
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families and communities, it may also be the most realistic
in the contemporary liberal state. Religious communities for
most Canadians and Americans are not closed, monolithic,
or insulated; instead they are often large, diverse, and
integrated in many ways into secular life. The state can
make some room for structures of separation or insulation,
but it embodies to a much more significant extent the
mixing or m6lange of faiths and cultures.5 '
The last model-that of multicultural learning-thus
can be considered just as respectful of the religious
communities at stake as the first three models. Most
significantly, it is perhaps the most reflective of "all we've
got" as a state. As Peck discovers, secular arguments cannot
convince Tzuref or the stranger to change their beliefs or
their clothes. Closed religious communities do not depend
explicitly on the state and its constitutional framework for
their sense of selves. More open communities, participants
in a multicultural reality, may have more both to teach and
learn from the state with which they co-exist. Instead of
focusing on what it can do to contain or influence religious
communities, the state's energies are better directed to a
consideration of its own values and garments, woven from
the multiple stories and experiences of its citizens, their
children, and its schools. In articulating what is important
to them, religious communities and children help the state
trace and hone its own multicultural measurements.
The ways in which children belong to their families,
communities, and societies, and the many roles that
education is expected to play, are at the heart of an ongoing
discussion in both Canada and the United States. In
comparing stories taken from these two countries, I make
no claim as to the exclusivity of the pictures of religion,
family, law, and identity sketched in a North American
context. Neither do I wish to offer broad conclusions with
respect to the similarities and differences of Canadian and
American society and law; instead all four models should
resonate in both countries. Rather I conclude by noting
that, like the conversation recounted by Roth, the
discussion about children, education and religious identity
in the liberal state can be frustrating, exhausting, and
marked by misunderstanding. It can also help to sharpen
156. See SWEET, supra note 57. This book focuses on the theme of looking for
ways to support public mixed education.
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the distinctive features of all participants and to ensure
continued movement along a path broken by our children.
